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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TANGREN FAMILY TRUST
SHARON FISCUS, Trustee,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

Appeals Case No. 20140938

RODNEY TANGREN,
D efendant/A ppellant.

JURISDICTION
T his appeal is taken from the Order Denying i\1.otion to Set Aside Judgment, filed
September 15, 2014, by the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of the Seventh District Court, San
Juan County, State of U tah, which denied the UTAH R. Crv. P. 60(6) post-judgment motion
filed by Appellant Rodney Tangren (hereinafter "Tangren").

This Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to UTAH CODE A ·N. § 78A-4-103(2)G) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & ST AND ARDS OF REVIEW

ISSUE I:

Did the trial cou1t have the sttiject matter jurisdiction ivhen the 5 late of Nevada
had entered an orderpe11aining to similar issues as raised 1?)1the Plaintiffs?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whetber a trial court bas subject matter jurisdiction
presents a question of law which we review under a correction of error standard, giving no
particular deference to the trial court's determination." Relier v. Relier, 2012 UT App 323, ii 7,
291 P .3d 813 citing Case v. Case, 2004 UT App 423, ,1s, 103 P .3d 171.

PRESE RVATION: This issue is not required to be preserved. "Challenges to
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal."
1 of 56

Sonntag v. !Pard, 2011 UT App. 122, i/2, 253 P.3d 1120 citing Bro1v11 v. Division

ef Water Rights,

2010 UT 14, il 13, 228 P.3d 747.

ISSUE II:

Did the trial cott1t abuse its discretion in de1?)ting Defendant's LV!.otion to Set Aside
the Default Judgment and Writ ef Restitution pursuant to UTAH R CIV. P.
60(b) i?J, determining a) the service ef the 10-dqy Summons 1vas not prf!Judicial to
Tangren, b) default judgment 1vas proper/y obtained !:ry Plaintiff and proper/y
entered !:ry the trial court, and,· c) the tempormy restraining order 1vas proper/y
issued?

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW (UT. R. APP. P. 9(c)(7)(B)): " [A]
trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment." Arbogast

Famify Trust ex reL Arbogast v. River Crossings, LLC, 2008 UT App 277, ii 7, 191 P.3d 39 citing
Lund v. Bro1vn, 2000 UT 75,

ii

9, 11 P.3d 277. However, "the court's discretion is not

unlimited." Id. citt"r1g Lund (stating that district courts have broad discretion in ruling on
motions for relief from judgment); see also State v. 736 N. Colo. St., 2004 UT App 232, ii 7, 95
P.3d 1211 ("A denial of a mo tion to vacate a [default] judgment under rule 60(6) is ordinarily
reversed only on abuse of discretion." (internal quotation marks omitted)), afj'd sub nom. State

v. All Real Proper!} at 736 N. Colo. St., 2005 UT 90, 127 P.3d 693. " [T] he interpretation of a
rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." Arbogast Fami/y Trust

ex reL Arbogast v. River Crossings, LLC, 2008 UT App 277,
Glover, 2000 UT 89,

ii

7, 191 P.3d 39 citing Bro1vn v.

i/ 15, 16 P.3d 540.

PRESERVATION: This issue is not required to be preserved, as it turns on the
trial court's conclusions of law. However, these issues were preserved in Tangren's Motion
to Set Aside and at oral arguments in post-judgment proceedings.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
I.

U.S. CONST. ART. IV § 1
2 of 56

•

•
II .
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

UTAH R.
UTAH R.
UTAH R.
UTAH R.
U TAH R.

CIV. P. 4

Crv. P. 5
Crv. P. 55
CIV. P. 60(6)
Crv . P. 65A

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

On February 24, 1994, T angren entered into a 99 year lease with his father,

Richard T angfen, the Trustee for the Tangren Family Trust (hereinafter, the "Trust") for
the subject property at issue below (hereinafter, the "Lease"). The Lease is attached hereto
as Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference.
2.

The Lease requires Tangren to maintain insurance on the subject property but

is silent with respect to any particulars regarding insurance, including any required amount or
types o f policies. See) Addendum "A" at

~iJs, 7.

T angren agreed to be responsible for yearly

estimated annual real property taxes and insurance costs, which were to be paid in twelve
(12) monthly payments each year with the monthly rent. Id at

ifs.

The Trust agreed to pay

the real property taxes and insurance from Tangren's monthly payment. Id. at iJ7.

3.

In 2002, Plaintiff initiated a judicial action against Tangren, which requested

the forfeiture of the subject property in favor of Plaintiff and the same trial court herein
determined the Lease was invalid; however, T angren ultimately appealed and prevailed in the
Court of Appeals and in the Utah Supreme Court. See) Tangren Famib Trust ex re! Tangren v.

Tangren, 2006 UT App. 515, 154 P.3d 180 qffirmed qy Tangren Fami!J Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT
20, 182 P.3d 326. That case concluded in 2008.
4.

Legal proceedings were also initiated involving these same parties in the State

of Nevada regarding the Trust. On August 22, 2012, the Clark County District Court
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•
ordered Tangren to secure a $1 million liability insurance policy upon the subject property,
to provide Plaintiff with evidence of the same, and to bear all expenses associated with

•

securing the policy. T his order is attached hereto as Addendum "B" and is more particularly
defined as the "Nevada Order".
5.

On March 1, 2012, Plaintiff initiated an eviction action against Tangren in the

Seventh District Court, San J uan County, Utah, in order to evict Tangren from the property
herein; however, this action was dismissed pursuant to the parties' agreement to dismiss it as
part of the Nevada case. The docket of this case, District Court Case No. 120700005, is
attached hereto as Addendum "C" and is incorporated herein by this reference. See also, the
Nevada Order, Addendum " B".
6.

This case was initiated on April 23, 2013, by Plaintiff filing the Complaint,

which requested an injunction against Tangren and for an order of restitution based upon

•

the Lease1 . R010. The Complaint is attached hereto as Addendum "D" and incorporated
herein by this reference. Plaintiff averred the Lease required Tangren to pay insurance and
alleged Tangren had failed to make other insurance and tax payments required by the Lease.

•

R004-R010. Plaintiff specifically alleged Tangren was having a fly-in (which includes
skydiving and airplane activity) that would put the property at risk for liability. Id. However,
Plaintiff attached did not attach the Lease or other default notices to the Complaint and
simply alleged the breach. See, id.

1

This action was filed by Plaintiff as a contract case. H owever, Plaintiff alleged the breach of
the Lease by Tangren. Plaintiff alleged Tangren had failed to obtain the correct amount of
insurance required by the Lease protect Plaintiff, the property, and Tangren. See, Complaint
at p. 2.
4 of 56

•

7.

On April 30, 2013, Tangren was served with a 10 Day Summons and

Complaint. R014; R013. The 10-Day Summons is attached hereto as Addendum "E" and
incorporated herein by this reference. The Summons instructed Tangren to file an Answer
within 10 days of the service of the Summons upon him, that a copy of the Complaint was
attached to the Summons, and that a copy of the Complaint was on file with the court.
R013. This Return of Service 2 states Tangren was served with the Summons and Complaint.
R014.
8.

The Complaint and 10-Day Summons do not have case numbers and appear

identical to the captions of the 2002 case and the 2012 case Plaintiff previously filed in
Seventh District Court, San Juan County, State of Utah. Thus, the three (3) court cases
Plaintiff has filed against Tangren in Seventh District, San Juan County, Utah, appear nearly
indistinguishable in appearance because the same parties are involved, in the same court, and
before the same judge.
9.

On May 6, 2013, the matter convened for hearing on Plaintiffs' request for

temporary orders, wherein Tangren maintained he complied with the Nevada Order. R015.
Counsel for Plaintiff also indicated to the trial court that the Nevada case was only to handle
the Trust and there was no pending case in Nevada. Id.
10.

On May 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed the proposed order from the temporary orders

hearing, which was signed by the trial court on May 8, 2013. R017. The proposed order does
not contain a certificate of mailing and was not served upon Tangren in any fashion after the

All of the Returns of Service in this case are attached hereto as Addendum "F" and
incorporated herein by this reference.
2
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hearing - thereby meaning Tangren had no opportunity to object to the proposed language

•

of the temporary order. Id.
11.

The Temporary Order indicates the trial court reviewed the Nevada Order

and ordered T angren not to have the fly-in on the property until S2,000,000 in liability
insurance was obtained. Id. There is no certificate of service contained in the Temporary
Order. Id. There is an address line on the bottom of the last page that indicates the
Temporary Order would be served upon Tangren; however, Review of each return of
service in this case does not show that Tangren was ever served with the Temporary Order.

Id; see, Addendum "F". The Temporary Order is attached hereto as Addendum "G" and
incorporated herein by this reference.
12.

In July of 2013, Plaintiffs began to pursue defauJt against Tangren. This is

evidenced by the court docket in this matter, which is attached hereto as Addendum "I-I"
and incorporated herein by this reference (the docket was also attached to the Motion to Set
Aside, which was filed later in the case).

13.

On J uly 3, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a proposed 3 order of judgment and writ of

restitution, which do not contain certificates of mailing. See, Addendum "H" at p. 3. The
clerk's note on J uly 3, 2013, states, "[n]o default certificate has been submitted or entered on
this case. The summons was not filed with the return of service." Id.

14.

On July 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed another Return of Service, which again

indicated the Summons and Complaint were served on Tangren. R018-R019. This Return

3

The proposed orders filed by Plaintiffs on July 3, 10, and September 3, 2013, are attached
hereto as Addendum "I" and incorporated herein by this reference. None of the p roposed
orders contain certificates of mailing.
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•

indicated the same date of service of the Summons and Complaint as April 30. Id. Plaintiff
re-filed the Return of Service and the Summons on Return with the notation of the deputy
in the upper right hand of the document per the direction of the clerk of the court to obtain
the Default Certificate. See, id.

15.

Also on July 10, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the proposed default certificate and writ

of restitution. See, Addendum "H" at p. 3. On J uly 22, 2013, the docket indicates the clerk
noted, " [t]he Writ of Restitution refers to a Judgment, but no judgment has been signed and
no judgment has been submitted." Id.

16.

On September 3, 2013, the proposed judgment was filed by Plaintiffs. Id.

17.

On September 5, 2013, the Order

efJudgment (the "Default Judgment")

and

Writ ef Restitution "Writ of Restitution") were entered, R021 & R023, and the matter was set
for hearing to determine damages. R024.
18.

On October 14, 2013, Plaintiff moved for an order to show cause against

Tangren. R026-R029. The basis of the order to show cause was that Tangren had failed to
provide Plaintiff with a copy of the insurance policy and had permitted skydiving on the
property, which was not covered by the policy. See, id.

19.

On October 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Return of Service, which lists service of

the following documents upon Tangren: "Order to Show Cause", "Notice of Hearing for to
Determine Rent and Insurance" [sic], "Notice of Judgement" [sic], and "Affidavit of Craig
Halls". R030. No Notice of J udgment was filed by Plaintiff in this matter. See, id.
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20.

On November 4, 2013, the matter convened for hearing, wherein Tangren

was advised by the trial court that the Default Judgment had entered against him. R031.
Tangren was also assessed for Plaintiffs attorney fees at this hearing. Id.
21.

Until November 27, 2013, Tangren acted pro se in this case. R001-035. Prior

thereto, Tangren appeared at hearings held in this case, but was unaware of the entry of the
Certificate of D efault, Order of Judgment, and \'(/rit of Restitution, all of which entered
without notice to Tangren. See) id.
22.

Prior to Tangren obtaining counsel, none of the pleadings filed by Plaintiff

included certificates of mailing, except for the Certificates of Service filed by Plaintiff on
November 25, 2013. Id; R034.
23.

Accordingly, Tangren obtained counsel and filed lviotion to Set Aside Default

Judgment and Wi·it of Restitution ("Motion to Set Aside"), which was based upon UTAH R. Civ.
P. 60(6) and argued excusable neglect justified setting aside the default. R042. Tangren
argued the 10-Day Summons was fatally defective, Plaintiff violated notice provisions of
Rule 5 and in her obtaining default, and that default itself was improperly obtained pursuant
to procedure. Id. Tangren also argued he had a meritorious defense to the Complaint since
he had complied with the Nevada Order, that the interests of justice and fair play had been
violated, the Complaint's allegations were legally insufficient because it was really seeking to
enforce the Nevada Order, and the injunction was improperly obtained. Id. Thus, Tangren
argued the cumulative effect of the proceedings prohibited him from realizing the exact
nature of the proceedings against him and therefore prejudiced him. Id.

8 of 56

24.

On December 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed Rep!J Response in Opposition to Motion to

Set Aside Order ifJudgment and U~rit if Restitution, which argued the 10-Day Summons was valid
and that it was unnecessary to give notice to Tangren based on his failure to answer. R062.
25.

On January 24, 2014, Tangren replied to Plaintiffs response. R157.

26.

Oral argument was held on February 24, 2014 (R0161); however, the matter

was continued for additional evidence on March 11, 2014. See, Transcript of March 11, 2014,
hearing, post.
27.

After hearing, trial court ordered additional briefing on the limited issue of the

10-Day Summons issued by Plaintiff in this matter.
28.

On April 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed its brief on this subject on April 28, 2014

(R0193); however, Plaintiff had mailed the brief to Tangren's attorney well before filing it
and Tangren's Response to Plaintiffs Brief was actually filed before Plaintiffs Brief on April
28, 2014. R0182.
29.

On May 27, 2014, the matter was submitted for decision and the trial court

entered its fulling on August 13, 2014, \vhich is attached hereto as Addendum "J" and
incorporated herein by this reference. R207.
30.

The trial court determined it did not credit Tangren's testimony regarding

service or that he was confused by the multiple proceedings. Id. The trial court determined
Tangren was properly served with the summons and complaint and determined the only
ground for setting aside default it considered seriously was the service of a 10-day Summons
rather than a 20-day Summons. Id. The trial court determined that, while erroneous, the 10-
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day Summons did not prejudice or affect Tangren. Id. Thus, the Motion to Set Aside was
denied and the Order was entered. Id.
31.

On September 15, 2014, the trial court entered its formal order, Order Detrying

LWotion to Set Aside Judgment (hereinafter, the "Judgment"). R211 . The Judgment is attached
hereto as Addendum "K".

32.

Tangren has timely appealed. R.241.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. M ay 6, 2013, Hearing.
On May 6, 2013, this matter convened for hearing on Plaintiffs request for injunctive
relief. 5/6/2013 Tr. at p. 3. Plaintiff proffered that the Lease in this case indices the Trustee
determines the estimate of the taxes and insurance for each year and Tangren would make
that part of his monthly payment on the property. Id. at pp. 4-5. Plaintiff argued Tangren
was holding a fly-in on the subject property and, when Plaintiff obtained an insurance quote
to cover the property for this activity, Tangren refused to pay it because the amount was
"outrageous". Id. at p. 7. Plaintiff alleged Tangren had been making payments for the
insurance on the lodge, which the Trust obtained and Tangren made part of his monthly
payment. Id. at p. 8. H owever, historically, no liability insurance had been purchased by the
Trust. Id. at p. 9.
Tangren indicated to the trial court that he would be representing himself because the
case was "pretty cut and dry" and "self evident". Id. at p. 10. Tangren argued that, in 2011,
Plaintiff determined there needed to be a million dollar policy on the property and $250,000
on the lodge, which Tangren agreed with. Id. at pp. 10-1 1. Tangren paid these insurance
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amounts for a year and a half. Id. at p. 11. Then Plaintiff determined there needed to be
more than these policy limits and indicated the policy needed to be for $2 million and then

$3 million, which T angren disagreed with. Id.
Tangren indicated to the trial court, which was undisputed, that he filed a case in
Nevada to challenge Sharon Fiscus as the Trustee due to the disagreement they were having
regarding the insurance policies on the property. Id. Tangren represented that the fly-in,
including the sky-diving and airplanes, \Vas discussed with the Nevada court, which ruled
that a $1 million policy was sufficient. Id. T angren stated this matter should be resolved in
Nevada and submitted the

evada Order to the trial court, which it reviewed. Id. at p. 12.

Plaintiff argued the Nevada case had been concluded but did not resolve the issue. Id.
However, Tangren indicated more things needed to be brought up with the Nevada court.

Id. at p. 13. Plaintiff stated the Nevada Order allowed Tangren to purchase his own
insurance for the lodge. Id. Tangren indicated the Nevada Order allowed him to combine his
personal insurance with what was needed on the property and secured ~250,000 on the lodge
and a million in liability for the property. Id.
It was clarified that the case involving the Trust was filed in Nevada because it was
created there by the parties' mother, who also died in Nevada. Id. at pp. 14-15. The Plaintiff
stated it was not relying upon the Nevada Order to determine what insurance should be
required on the property, as Plaintiff wanted the runway and specific activities covered on
the property. Id. at p. 17. Plaintiff argued it did not dispute the Nevada Order, which
Plaintiff represented only covered the lodge, and further stated, " [w]e don't think the
Nevada court should exercise jurisdiction over what k..ind of insurance should be placed on
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the airstrip." Id. at p. 18, In. 14-16. Plaintiff argued the amount ordered by the Nevada court
did not include the fly-in or other activities occurring on the property. Id. at p. 19.
The trial court stated, " [s]ee, I think the Nevada court has no business whatsoever
dealing with the contract, the lease agreement between the Trust and Rodney Tangren." Id.
at p. 20, In. 14-16. Tangren responded that, "[t]he reason they did that is because that is still
in the Trust, that lease is, and that's why it is in Nevada. I also have the insurance." Id. at p.

•

20, ln. 17-19.

The trial court stated the Lease should be determined in Utah and that if Nevada
wanted to tell the Trustee what to do or not do, the Nevada court would need to be trustee
or remove Plaintiff was trustee. Id. at pp. 20-21. The trial court determined the Lease deals
with a parcel of Utah property and the Nevada court had no business enforcing lease
agreements dealing in Utah property. Id. at p . 21. Based on Tangren's representation that the
property is worth $2 million, the trial court ordered that Tangren obtain this in coverage or
Tangren could not have the fly-in. Id. at p . 29. Plaintiff was ordered to prepare the order. Id.

B. N ovember 4, 2013, H earing.
This matter was called for hearing to determine the issue o f damages and attorney
fees as a result of the breach of the Lease. 11/4/2013 Tr. at p . 3. Testimony was taken and
exhibits were received by the trial court. Ms. Fiscus testified regarding the issues she and
Tangren had regarding the insurance and the policies on the property. Id. at pp. 5-8. She
further testified regarding default notices pertaining to rent and the amounts Tangren owed
under the Lease. Id. at p. 7. Ms. Fiscus summarily testified that T angren had failed to abide
by the Temporary order and had not been able to determine the exact terms of the coverage
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of the policy Tangren had obtained on the property. Id. at pp. 8-9. Ms. Fiscus also testified
she had not received a copy of the policy pursuant to the Temporary O rder. Id. at p. 10.
Later in the hearing, Ms. Fiscus admitted she had received the copy of the

~2,000,000.00 policy in the past week or week and a half. Id. at p. 40. Ms. Fiscus testified she
had her attorney request the copy of the poJjcy from Tangren; however, Tangren was under
the impression it was sent. Id. at p. 42. Ms. Fiscus wanted to receive a copy of the complete
copy of the policy, which the trial court said she could have. Id. at p. 43.
Tangren also testified at trus hearing. Tangren testified he had complied with
everytrung he had been ordered to do. Id. at pp. 27-28. Tangren brought up problems with
the ranch to Ms. Fiscus and her attorney was aware of them because he had written
correspondence regariling it in the Nevada case. Id. at p. 28.
Plaintiff requested that Tangren be found in contempt of the trial court's temporary
order because Tangren had admitted he conducted activities on the property and put the
ranch in jeopardy of liability without having the appropriate insurance. Id. at p . 44. Plaintiff
also argued Tangren had not supplied a copy of the insurance policy, which was requested
repeatedly by Plaintiff throughout the proceedings. Id.
Tangren disagreed he was in contempt because he had had done everything that was
required, which was to get insurance in the correct amount. Id. at p. 45. Tangren argued the
skyiliving event was doubly covered by his insurance and by Sky Dive Moab. Id. Tangren
argued he had the $2,000,000.00 policy since day one and there was no way he would
jeopardize what he had over frivolous things. Id. Tangren had no objection to Ms. Fiscus
having a foll copy of the policy and had informed his insurance company of this fact. Id.
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The trial court determined Tangren had not paid the amounts as reguested by
Plaintiffs in this matter and further assess T angren attorney fees. Id. at p. 46. After reviewing
the Temporary Order, the trial court determined it clearly stated Tangren was not only to
obtain the insurance but to provide copies of it to Plaintiff. Id. at pp. 47-48. T he trial court
stated, "[i]t's not the responsibility of the trustee or her attorney to keep nagging him to get
it; but his responsibility to get it to them, which he didn't do." Id. at p. 48, ln. 2-4. The trial
court determined this was an intentional act by Tangren and found Tangren to be in
contempt of court. Id. at pp. 48-49. The following exchange then took place:
The Court: ... You do realize, Mr. Tangren, that I've already signed a default
judgment with respect to possession of the land?
Mr. Tangren: I didn't - this is the first I've heard about this, Your Honor.
Mr. Halls: I've sent you about three copies in the Mr. Tangren: Where have you - I have notMr. Halls: -- I've served you with it.
Mr. Tangren: I have not got anything on my email. If you did, did you not
serve them through the sheriff like you did everything else?
Mr. Halls: Twice.
Mr. Tangren: Well, where is it?
The Court: All right, you can go.

Id. at p. 49, ln. 3-16. Whereupon, the hearing was concluded. Id. at p . 49.
C. February 24, 2014, Hearing.
This hearing was held for oral arguments upon the Motion to Set J\side. 2/24/2014
Tr. at p. 3. Counsel herein argued the Motion to Set Aside in its entirety. When the issue of
the 10-day Summons was mentioned by counsel, the trial court stated, "[o]bviously this isn't
the classic ten day summons that the debt collection companies use. This was a shortened
period of time which is common in eviction cases." Id. at p. 6, ln. 7-1 0. Counsel noted the
first return of service does not indicate Tangren was served with the Temporary Restraining
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Order. Id. Counsel made the trial court aware of the prior litigation between the parties and
that the Summons in this case did not contain a case number. Id. at p. 7.
Counsel argued the reason Tangren did not file an answer after the May 6, 2013,
hearing was because from T angren's point of view, nothing had happened. Id. at pp. 7-8.
Tangren was unaware from May 6, 2013, to October 16, 2013, during whjch time he
received no further paperwork in the matter and he was worbng on compliance with the
trial court's oral order from the May 6, 2013,

hearing. Id. at pp. 7-8. Plaintiff filed a

proposed order from the May 6 hearing but there was no certificate of mailing indicating it
had been sent to Tangren, wruch prevented Tangren from objecting to the content of the
order. Id. at p. 8. Additionally, the proposed order was filed on May 7 and signed by the trial
court on May 8. Id. T hus, even if Plaintiff mailed the proposed o rder to Tangren, there was
not enough time fo r Tangren to object before it was entered by the trial court. Id.
Counsel argued there were no certificates of mailing in this case until October 16,

2013. Id. at p. 9.

When Plain tiff began to seek default judgment and no documents

concerning trus was deLivered to Tangren. Id. at pp. 9-10. The clerk filed the Certificate of
Default on July 10 but had initially refused to do so; however, Plaintiff remedied the clerk's
concern in order for her to do so. Id. The trial court stated that there is really no requirement
that a party be informed the opposing party is seeking default if the party has not filed an
answer after being served with a summons and complaint. Id. at p. 11.
Counsel argued that T angren djd appear and participate in the proceedings. Id.
Counsel then explained to the trial court which documents should have been served/ mailed
to Tangren as set forth by the Motion to Set Aside. Id. at pp. 12-14. Counsel argued it was
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inconsistent for Tangren to ignore this case when he had faithfully prosecuted his interests
earlier in the other litigation cases involving the parties. Id. at p. 18. Tangren requested that,
based upon fundamental fairness, the judgment should be set aside and the case heard on its
merits. Id. at pp. 18-19.
Based on the arguments of the parties, the trial court stated that its decision would
turn on whether the Summons and Co mplaint were served on Tangren on April 30, 2013. Id.
at p. 44. The trial court stated that, as far as it could tell, the rules did not require the filing of
anything except the certificate of default. Id.
The trial court indicated there were only two (2) grounds upon which it could set
aside the judgment in this case, which were: 1) Tangren was never served with the complaint,
or; 2) Tangren was served with the complaint but was excusably negligent. Id. The trial court
stated it would be very difficult for it to determine excusable neglect if Tangren was served
with the complaint because it was possible T angren was confused, acting as a pro se litigant.

Id. at pp. 45-46. However, the trial court stated that, parties who elect to forego hired
counsel suffer the penalty of confusion that results from not understanding the pleadings
and failing to seek legal advice. Id. at p. 46. T hus, the trial court believed its decision was
going to turn on whether or not it believed T angren was served with the complaint on April
30. Id. The trial court stated as follows:

It's very likely if I determine that he was served with the complaint, that I will
determine that his neglect is not excusable. And if I find that he was not
served with the complaint, I will without difficulty at all set aside the
judgment. So I think I need to make that factual determination before I
proceed.
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Id. at p. 46, ln. 19-24. Thus, the matter was set for hearing in order to take the testimony of
witnesses. See, id. at pp. 47-49.

D. March 11, 2014, Hearing.
This matter convened for hearing on March 11, 2014, to take evidence regarding the
legitimacy of the service upon Tangren on April 30, 2013. 3/11 /2014 Tr. at p. 4. Deputy
Shawn Chapman testified he properly served Tangren with the Summons and Complaint,
which the trial court placed credibility upon in its final determination. Id. at pp. 5-18.
Tangren denied he had been served with the Complaint. Id. at pp. 40-44. However,
the trial court ultimately determined in its written ruling that it did not find Tangren to be
credible. This determination is not attacked herein.
Counsel for Tangren argued in closing that the returns of service and certificates of
mailing on the pleadings in this case were suspect because the returns fail to list all of the
documents Deputy Chapman testified he served and the certificates are not included in the
pleadings at all until October of 2013. Id. at pp. 56-57. During this argument, the trial court
stated, "[i]f you're going to spend your time on this, you're wasting it." Id. at p. 57, ln. 15-16.
Counsel argued that the fact Plaintiff was not following proper procedure explained a lot of
the confusion in this case. Id. After further explaining Tangren's position on this issue, the
trial court stated, "[r)ight. Times up. Most of your arguments, Ms. White, are red herrings."
Id. at p. 58. The trial court stated it was fully convinced the summons and complaint were

served upon Tangren; however, there was an issue its attention had been drawn to in the
Motion to Set Aside, which was regarding the issuance of the 10-Day Summons. Id. at p. 59.
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The trial court then asked Plaintiff's counsel why a 10-Day Summons was issued in
this matter. Id. Plaintiffs counsel stated it had requested a shortened period of time for a
hearing due to the fly-in on the ranch. Id. However, the trial court stated that, while it
understood the need for an expedited hearing, it cud not explain the summons stating
Tangren had 10 days to file an answer to the complaint. Id. The trial court further stated it
had looked in its electronic file in vain for any indication to what lead to the issuance of the
10-Day Summons. Id. at p. 60. Further discussion between Plaintiffs counsel and the trial
court determined that the Summons cud not fulfill the requirements of an unlawful detainer.

Id. at pp. 61-62. The trial court noted that, while Tangren raised the issue in the Motion to
Set Aside, Plaintiff did not address this issue in its response. Id. at pp. 62-63. The trial court
indicated there was a possibibt:y that grounds for a three (3) day summons were met in this
case but instead a 10-day Summons was issued. Id. Further, there was a case from 1975 that
the trial court was aware of that had determined the defectiveness of a 20 day Summons
when a 30 day summons was required. Id. at p. 62.
The parties agreed additional briefing on this issue would be warranted, although
counsel for Tangren had attempted to argue it at the previous hearing but had been cut off
by the trial court. Id. at pp. 64, 66. The trial court thereupon set a briefing schedule for this
issue. Id. at p. 71.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
On May 6, 2013, the trial court was presented with the fact that litigation regarding
the issue of insurance had been undertaken in Nevada. The trial court immediately cusagreed
the Nevada court had any jurisdiction in this matter and rejected the Nevada Order as
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having any authority. However, this impacted the trial court's jurisdiction over this matter
and the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case.
Additionally, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Motion to Set Aside,
as the Motion to Set addressed several errors committed during the proceedings. However,
the trial court overlooked issues with service of process, the mailing of standard pleadings to
Tangren from the Plaintiff, the failure of Plaintiff to follow several rules of procedure, and
whether a temporary restraining order and default judgment were correctly entered and
pleaded for by Plaintiffs. Based upon the cumulative errors in this case, the denial of the
Motion to Set Aside should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION PROPERLY LIES IN THE STATE
OF NEVADA IN THIS CASE.
"Subject matter jurisdiction ... is the authority of the court to decide the case." Johnson

v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, i\ 8, 234 P.3d 1100 citing Chen v. Ste1va11, 2004 UT 82, ii 38, 100 P.3d
1177. "Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the first
time on appeal." Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App. 122, i12, 253 P.3d 1120 citing Bronm v. Division

of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ii 13, 228 P.3d 747.
It is fundamental that the courts of each state shall give full faith and credit to
valid judgments rendered in a sister state. [U.S.CONST., ART. IV, sec. 1; Van
Kleeck Creamery, Inc. v. Lf:1/estern Frozen Products Co., 24 Utah 2d 63, 465 P.2d 544
(1970)] . However, this does not preclude the court of the forum state from
examining into the question of jurisdiction of the foreign state when that
question is properly raised. [Id.; Simms v. Hobbs, Ok.I., 411 P.2d 503 (1966); Dery
v. Wis1vall, 11 Ariz.App. 306, 464 P.2d 626 (1970); Tucker v. Vista Financial
Corp., Colo., 560 P.2d 453 (1977); National Equipment Renta~ Ltd. v. T cry/or, 225
Kan. 58, 587 P.2d 870 (1978)]. This is so because due process of law requires
the acquisition of jurisdiction as a prerequisite to the validity of any judgment.
A further rule applicable to such matters is that if the same issue as to the
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jurisdiction of the foreign court was raised and adjudicated therein, then the
determination of that issue becomes res judicata, and is entitled to full faith
and credit, the same as any other issue that has been so determined.[47
Arn.Jur.2d, Judgments, sec. 1260.)

Fuf/emvider Co. v. Patterson, 611 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1980).

In this matter, the issue of jurisdiction was addressed on May 6, 2013, in the
temporary orders hearing. See, 5/6/2013 Tr. Tangren represented the trial court that he had
challenged Ms. Fiscus as Trustee of the Trust in Nevada due to their disagreement regarding
the payment insurance policies on the property. Id. at p. 11. Tangren stated this matter
should be resolved in Nevada and submitted there. Id. at p. 12. Contrarily, Plaintiff argued
the Nevada case was concluded but it had not resolved the issue of insurance. Id. Plaintiff
argued that the Nevada court should not have jurisdiction over the kind of insurance on the
property and the trial court determined the Nevada court had no business to deal with the
Lease between Tangren and the Trust. Id. at p. 20. Further, the trial court erroneously stated
the Nevada court would have to remove Ms. Fiscus as Trustee if it wanted to tell the Trustee
what to do or what not do. Id. at pp. 20-21 . Thus, the trial court reviewed the Nevada Order,
concluded it had jurisdiction, and ordered Tangren to obtain $2 million in liability insurance
on the property. Id. at p . 29.
Tangren did not raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction below. However, this
challenge is appropriately brought in this appeal because subject matter jurisdiction goes to
the authority of a court to decide a case, Johnson at il 8, and may be raised at any time. Sonntag
at ii 2. Thus, even on appeal, this challenge is appropriately made herein.
The trial court determined the Nevada court had no jurisdiction to make orders
regarding Utah property and the Lease; however, the Nevada court was well within its
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jurisdiction to make orders regarding the Trust. See, Fu/lemvider at 389. It appears the trial
court determined the Nevada court had no jurisdiction without properly determining the law
on the issue. T angren pursued relief in Nevada due to his disagreement with the Trust and
the insurance policies it was seeking to place and obtained an order giving the Trustee
instructions, which is within the jurisdiction of the Nevada court in a probate matter. Thus,
the issue of res judicata is necessarily raised as well as the trial court's refusal to acknowledge
the full faith and credit of the Nevada Order. See, Fullemvider.
Accordingly, Tangren challenges the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction in that 1)
the Nevada Order was entitled to full faith and credit as a foreign order and 2) the issue of
insurance was subject to issue preclusion.

A. The Nevada Order Was Entitled to Full Faith And Credit.
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and P roceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
tl1ereof." U.S. CONST. ART. IV § 1. The Utah Supreme Court has held, " ... a foreign
judgment that is both valid and final cannot be collaterally attacked even if grounded on
errors of law or fact." LVlatter

of Estate of Jones,

858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah, 1993) citing Data

Management Sys., Inc. v. EPD Co1p., 709 P .2d 377, 379 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (additional
citations omitted).
"To be 'valid,' for p urposes of full faith and credit, a judgment must have been
rendered by a court with competent jurisdiction and in compliance with the constitutional
requirements of due process." Jones at 985 citing Data Nlanagement, 709 P .2d at 379.
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"The second requirement for full faith and credit is that the judgment be final
according to the laws of the state of rendition." Jones at 986 citing People of State ofN . Y. ex rel

HalV(!)' v. I-Ialvry, 330 U.S. 610,614, 67 S.Ct. 903,906, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947); Thorlry v. Supnior
Cottt1, 78 Cal.App.3d 900, 144 Cal.Rptr. 557,561 (1978) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
ofLa1vs, § 107 (1971)).
In Nevada, there are several appealable orders that exist rn probate proceedings.
" ... an appeal may be taken to the appellate court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to the
rules fixed by the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 4 of Article 6 of the Nevada
Constitution within 30 days after the notice of ent1y of an order. .. instructing or appointing a
trustee." NRS 155.190.
The trial court in this case determined at the out-set that it had jurisdiction over this
matter because the subject property is located in Utah and the Nevada court had "no
business" over the Lease between Tangren and the Trust. Thus, the question is whether the
Nevada Order was entitled to full faitl1 and credit pursuant to U.S. CONST. ART. IV § 1. To
appropriately determine its jurisdiction, the trial court was required to determine whether the
Nevada Order was valid and final. Jones at 985.
The Nevada Order was valid because it was rendered by a court with competent
jurisdiction. Jones at 985. It was undisputed by the parties on May 6, 2013, that they had
participated in the Nevada proceedings and it is assumed they did so willingly. See, id;
5/6/2013 Tr. at p. 11.
Further, it was represented by the Plaintiff that the Nevada case had concluded.
5/6/2013 Tr. at p. 12. \X/hile it was disputed whether the Nevada court received evidence
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regarding the fly-in and Plaintiff argued the issue of insurance was not resolved, the trial
court did not pursue this point any further. See, id. Based on Plaintiffs own representation,
the matter in Nevada had concluded. Additionally, pursuant to Nevada law, an order in a
probate matter that instructs the Trustee is an appealable order. N RS 155.190. The trial court
reviewed the Nevada Order on May 6, 2013, and the Trustee is instructed therein by the
Nevada court. See, Addendum "B".

Thus, the Nevada Order was presumably a final order

at the time of the May 6, 2013, hearing. As such, the Nevada Order was entitled to full force
and credit and the trial court herein had no jurisdiction to enter orders regarding tl1e
insurance when the Nevada case had jurisdiction over this issue and had ruled upon it.

B. Collateral Estoppel Prevents The Issue of Insurance To Be Relitigated In
This Case After It Was Fully Litigated In Nevada.
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct branches: claim preclusion and
issue preclusion. Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Nen;qys, Inc., 2000 UT 93,

ii

19, 16 P.3d 1214

(2000) citing Sn;ainston v. Intermountain H ealth Care, 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988). Macris
continued as follows:
The basic difference between the two branches of res judicata is simply put:
while "claim preclusion applies to whole claims, whether litigated or not," and
prevents parties from relitigating the same claim in a second suit, 18 James
Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice§ 131 .13[1] (Matthew Bender, 3d ed.2000)
(emphasis added), issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, arises from a
different cause of action and prevents parties or their privies from relitigating
"particular issues that have been contested and resolved."

Id. at

~

34. The following test is applied to determine whether tl1e doctrine of issue

preclusion is applicable:
First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and in the
case at hand. Second, the issue must have been decided in a final judgment on
the m erits in the previous action. Third, the issue must have been
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competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the previous action. Fourth, the party
against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must have
been either a party or privy to a party in the previous action.
Id. at

ii 37

citing Jones, !Fa/do, Holbrook & McDonough v. Da1vson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah

1996); see also S1vainston, 766 P .2d at 1061. Additionally, "[a]ll four elements must be present
for issue preclusion to apply." Id. citing Jones, Lf:1/aldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 923 P.2d at 1370.

"In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or their
privies and also the same cause of action; and this precludes the relitigation of all issues that
could have been litigated as well as those that were in fact litigated in the prior action." Estate

of Covington By and Through Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677 (1994) citing Schaer v. State ex
rel. UDOT, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983) quoting Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690
(Utah 1978). Covington continued as follows:
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues that
have once been litigated even though the claims for relief may be different.
Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). Thus, whereas
res judicata prevents a relitigation of identical causes of action or demands,
collateral estoppel disallows a relitigation of issues. Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1340.

Id.
In the instant case, the trial court was well aware the Nevada court had entered an
order regarding the payment of insurance on th e subject property in this case. However, the
trial court erred by proceeding in this case because Plaintiffs' claims were precluded by
collateral estoppel.
As noted supra, it would be res judicata for any issue that had been determined in
another action in a sister state that was entitled to full faith and credit. See, Fullen1JJider at 389.
The Nevada Order clearly determined the issue of insurance and gave other instructions to
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the Trustee regarding the subject property. See, Addendum "B". The parties even agreed to
dismiss an earlier Utah action filed by Plaintiff against Tangren in the Nevada Order, which
clearly signifies their agreement

to

be bound by Nevada's jurisdiction over them to abide by

its orders.
After the conclusion of the Nevada case, as indicated by Plaintiff at hearing on May
6, 2013, Plaintiff pursued the issue of insurance herein that had been already contested and
resolved by the parties in the Nevada case. LV!.acris at ii 34. However, instead of pursuing the
concerns of the Trust in the Nevada case, Plaintiff pursued a different cause of action
(eviction and breach of contract) in Utah. Id.
The issue of the obtaining and payment of insurance is identical to the Nevada case,
which was pursued by Tangren to remove Ms. Fiscus as Trustee due to his disagreement
with her regarding the insurance. Id. at

ii

37. The Nevada Order resulted in orders for

Tangren to obtain insurance on the subject property, which Plaintiff alleged in this case that
Tangren did not have at all. Further, as argued supra, the issue was decided in a final order
and a hearing was held thereon, as shown by the plain language of the Nevada Order. See, id.
The Nevada Order was also the result of competent, full, and fair litigation and there is
nothing in the record no show the contrary. Id. Lastly, both parties herein were parties to the
Nevada case. Id. Accordingly, each prong of the issue preclusion test has been met and it
therefore should have been applied herein. lei.
Further, inasmuch as res judicata applies herein, Plaintiffs' claims herein properly
belong in the Nevada case, as they could have been litigated therein. See, Covington at 677.
Plaintiff should have been prevented from relief simply because she masked her claims as
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issues to be relitigated in Utah. Id. Accordingly, the trial court erred by determining it had
jurisdiction when the Nevada court had fully litigated the issues presented by Plaintiff.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO SET ASIDE PURSUANT TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(6).
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of

justice relieve a party or his legal representative from the final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect. .. or (6) any o ther reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." UTAH
R. CIV. P. 60(6). The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for the reason cited
herein, not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. Id. Additionally, the requesting party must show he has a meritorious defense. See,

Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dep't, 1999 UT App 330, il6, 991 P.2d 607.
When presented with a Rule 60(6) motion on the basis of excusable neglect, a trial
court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a judgment:
This discretion stems from the equitable nature of the excusable neglect
determination itself. By their nature, equitable inquiries are designed to be
flexible, taking into account all relevant factors in light of the particular
circumstances . .. the question is always whether the particular relief sought is
justified under principles of fundamental fairness in light of the particular
facts .

Jones v. La)'ton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ,117, 214 P. 3d 859 citing Reisbeck v. HCA Health Servs.

•
ef

Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, P 15, 2 P.3d 447. "Excusable neglect requires some evidence in order
to justify relief." Id. at ii 20. Excusable neglect is defined as the exercise of due diligence by a
reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances. IVhite Cap Constr. Suppfy, Inc. v. Star

lvlt. Consh~, Inc., 2012 UT App 70, i1s, 277 P.3d 649 (additional citations omitted).
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In this case, excusable neglect existed throughout the case and is therefore argued
herein in the chronological order of events, for the Court's convenience. When viewed as
one large whole, the cumulative excusable neglect and prejudice developed throughout the
case. As such, these arguments are presented below.

A. Tangren Was Prejudiced By The Service Of The 10-Day Summons, Which
Was Compounded By Plaintiffs' Failures To Abide By The Rules of
Procedure That Occurred Cumulatively Throughout This Case And
Affected The Outcome.
Rule 3(a) of the UTAH RULES OF PROCEDURE states in pertinent part, " [a] civil action
1s commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons
together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with Rule 4." Rule 12(a) requires a 20
day summons to be served upon a civil defendant. In unlawful detainer cases, a court may
issue a summons containing anywhere from 3-20 days to file an answer, depending upon the
nature of the unlawful detainer. See, UTAH CODE AN. 1. §78B-6-801, et seq, setting forth the
Forcible Entry and Detainer code.

In the case of Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure•Rite, Inc., the court held, "[t]he unlawful
detainer statute is a summary proceeding and in derogation of the common law. It provides
a severe remedy, and [the Utah Supreme Court) has previously held that it must be strictly
complied with before the cause of action may be maintained." Ibid., 2001 UT App 347, ~18,
37 P.3d 1202 citing Sovereen v. 1VI.eado1vs, 595 P.2d 852, 853-54 (Utah 1979) (holding that where
notice "did not give lessee the alternative of paying the delinquent rent or surrendering the
premises" the no tice was "insufficient 'to place [the lessee] in unlawful detainer'" (citation
o mitted)).
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In the case of Nla11in v. Nelson, the defendant was served with process by a California
peace o fficer who falsified the facts in the return o f service. Ibid., 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975) 4 .
Additionally, the summons that was served upon the defendant required an answer in 20
days instead o f 30 days for an out of state resident. Ir/. The Utah Supreme Court held,
" [s]ervice of process here was defective, not only because of the false return but because it
required answer in 20 days instead of 30 days. Such service is jurisdictional." Id.
The failure of the Plaintiff to serve Tangren with the correct summons created an
unclear proceeding in this matter. It was unclear to the trial court and never fully explained
by the Plaintiff why T angren was served with a 10 day summons. See, Addenda "E", "I". A
shortened time in which to answer a complaint, likely due to the unlawful detainer claim in
the Complaint herein, is a severe remedy and must be strictly complied with before the cause
of action may be maintained. Parkside at ip 8. Accordingly, as determined by the trial court,
Plaintiff was required to serve Tangren with a 20 day summons; however, strict compliance
with issuing the correct summons based on the relevant caselaw of Parkside and NI.artin "\Vas
required in this matter.

NI.artin is similar to this case due to the cumulative circum stances of this case. The
incorrect summons in this case failed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction; however,
inasmuch as the trial court deterrnined Tangren was not prejudiced by the incorrect
summon s, T angren argues herein he was in fact prejudiced due Plaintiffs' non-compliance
with the R ULES OF PROCEDURE and was prejudiced as a result. Plaintiffs' non-compliance
complicated the proceedings, robbed Tangren of n otice, and muddied the waters in order
4

Martin is attached hereto as Addendum " L" and incorporated herein by this reference for
the Court's convenience.
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for a pro se litigant to determine what exactly was happening. Accordingly, the prejudice
prong of thjs argument is examined post.

1.Plaintiff Failed To Comply With UTAH R. CIV. P. 5 And Did Not Serve
Pleadings Upon Tangren Throughout The Case, Thus Robbing Him
Of Notice Of The Proceedings.
A party filing a pleadjng after service of the summons and complain t is required to
serve upon the opposing party a copy of the pleadings filed with the court by electronic
filing, mail, email, fax, etc. See, UT. R. Crv. P. 5. Further, " [e]very pleading, order or pap er
reqwred by this rule to be served shall include a signed certificate of service showing the
name of the document served, the date and manner of service and on whom it was served."
UT. R. Crv. P. 5 (f). A party preparing an order of the court m ust " ... serve upon the other
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision." UT. R. Crv. P. 7(£)(2).
In this case, the trial court djd not directly rule on this argument from the Motion to

Set Aside. However, the trial court noted most of Tangren's arguments were "red herrings"
and the trial court focused its attention on whether the Summons and Complaint were
properly served. 3/11 /2014 Tr. at p. 58, 59. However, the fact that none of the pleadings for
approximately the first five (5) months of this case contained certificates of mailing
contributed to the confusion in this case.
Tangren and the Plaintiff have been involved in other litigation in Utah and in
Nevada. Litigation in Utah had resulted in appellate decisions, whjch were cited supra.
Further, Plaintiff had pursued an eviction case against Tangren in 2012, which Plaintiff
agreed to dismjss as part of the Nevada Order. See, Addenda "B" & "C". Accordingly, when
Plaintiff was served with the incorrect summons and Complaint in April of 2013, which did
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not contain case numbers, Tangren incorrectly believed this '\Vas a continuation of
proceedings continued with the prior actions. See, Addenda "D" & "E". This is particularly
true when it is considered that these three (3) actions involve the Plaintiff suing Tangren in
the same county in Utah and before the same judge. Thus, the caption of all of the pleadings
of these court cases are similar in appearance and contributed to T angren's belief Plaintiff
was pursuing further proceedings in an earlier case.
This incorrect belief was further supported when, after the temporary orders hearing
on May 6, 2013, he did not receive the proposed temporary order filed by Plaintiff - which
was prior to the time in which he had to answer the Complaint and which he was
undoubtedly entitled to object to - or the signed Temporary Order. The T emporary Order
indicates it would be served upon Tangren; however, a review of the returns of service and
certificates of mailing herein do not show it was ever served on Tangren. See, Addendum
"F". However, the Temporary Order was Plaintiffs' basis to pursue an order to show cause

against Tangren after Plaintiff obtained default judgment against Tangren.
Plaintiff did properly abided by Rule 5 in any pleadjng in this case before Tangren
obtained counsel. The following documents should have been mailed to or served upon
Defendant pursuant to Rules 4 and 5:
•

Affidavit filed on April 23, 2013; R003.

•

The proposed order resulting from the temporary orders hearing. Plaintiff filed
tl1e proposed Temporary Orders on May 7, 2013; the trial entered the
Temporary Orders on May 8, 2013. R017; see also, Addendum "H" at p . 3;
Addendum "I".

•

Proposed Judgment filed July 3, 2013; Addendum " I-I" at p. 3; Addendum "I".

•

Proposed Writ of Restitution filed July 3, 2013; Addendum "H" at p. 3;
Addendum " I".
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Proposed Certificate of Default filed July 10, 2013; Addendum "H" at p. 3;
Addendum "I".

•

Proposed Writ of Restitution filed July 10, 2013; Addendum "H" at p. 3;
Addendum "I".

•

Motion for Order to Show Cause; the Return of Service filed October 22 does
not list this was served upon Tangren. R030; see also, Addendum "F".

As a result, Tangren was deprived of the opportunity to respond or object to
Plaintiff's pleadings. While it may be argued Tangren failed to answer and therefore was not
entitled to service, which is addressed post, the failure to provide Tangren with the time to
object to the proposed Temporary Order and the fact the signed Temporary Order was
never served upon Tangren lead to a snowball effect that supported Tangren's belief that the
hearing on May 6, 2013, had concluded the matter.
While a pro se litigant is held to the same procedural rules and the law, a pro se
defendant's "lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure ... should be accorded every
consideration that may be reasonably be indulged." Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT App 286, if12,
76 P.3d 1170 citing Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) quoting Heathman v.

Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (1996). Tangren's lack of technical knowledge and
procedure was not accorded every consideration that may be reasonably indulged when the
default judgment was entered, particularly when a full review of the Returns of Service and
the pleadings would have indicated Tangren had received limited notice of the proceedings.
Tangren has opposed Plaintiff in every proceeding in which they are parties and has
prevailed on appeal against Plaintiff. Accordingly, Tangren was prejudiced throughout this
case and it resulted in default being entered against him, which he was unaware of until the
November 4, 2013, hearing.
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B. Default Judgment Was Improperly Granted Against Tangren.
"When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the
clerk shall enter the default of that party." UT. R. Crv. P. 55 (a). "Upon request of the
plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against the
defendant if. .. the default of the defendant is for failure to appear[.]"UT. R. Crv. P. 55 (6)(1).

In this case, default judgment was improperly granted against Tangren contrary to
Rule 55. Tangren did not fail to "otherwise defend" or appear in this case. Accordingly, the
clerk should not have entered the default certificate herein as argued further below.

1. Tangren Otherwise Defended In This Case.
"'[A]ll that must be shown for the entry of a default is that the defendant has failed
to answer the complaint in a timely fashion."' Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, ,Jl 5, 244 P.3d
391 citing Skancl?J v. Ca!cados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998). However, whether
a party has "othe1wise defended" is a matter of first impression in Utah under the particular
circumstances of this case.
The Federal Rule is similar to the Utah Rule respecting default judgments, which
states, "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must
enter the party's default." FED. R. Crv. P. 55(a). In analyzing default under the Federal Rule,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals held, [a]lthough appearance in an action typically involves
some presentation or submission to the court- a feature missing here- we have held that a
defaulting party 'has appeared' for Rule 55 purposes if it has 'indicated to the moving party a
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clear purpose to defend the suit."' Kry Bank ofNlaine v. Tablecloth Textile Co. Corp., 74 F.3d 349,
353 (1 st Cir. 1996) citing li!J.u,iiz v. Vidal, 739 F.2d 699, 700 (1st Cir.1984) quoting H.F. Livermore

C01p. v. Aktiengese!!scheft Gebmder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C.Cir.1970). "But because
judgments by default are disfavored, 'a court usually will try to find that there has been an
appearance by defendant."' Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Ee/at Computerized Technologies, Inc., 840
F.2d 685, 689 (9 th Cir. 1988) citing 10 C. Wright, A. :Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice &

Procedure§ 2683, at 433 (2d ed. 1983).
In the matter of H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengese!!scheft Gebruder Loepfe, the court
found there had been an appearance when the parties exchanged letters and had a series of
meetings and neither party had any doubt the suit would be contested if they did not reach a
settlement. Ibid., 432 F.2d 689 (D.C.Cir.1970). In the matter of U7i!son v. liif.oore & Assocs., Inc.,
it was determined an appearance had not been made because the letter that was exchanged
was partially responsive to the complaint but there were no settlement negotiations. Ibid.,
564 F.2d 366 (9th Cir.1977). In Direct Mai!, cited supra, it was determined the defendant's
actions did not demonstrate "a clear purpose to defend the suit" because the settlement
negotiations were conducted prior to and on the day the summons was served. Ibid. at 689.
Thereafter, there was no contact between the parties. Id.

In this case, Plaintiff obtained default against Tangren on September 5, 2013. R021 &
R023. Tangren argued in the Motion to Set Aside that default was improperly granted
because he personally appeared in this case; however, the trial court did not fully address this
issue in its denial of the Motion to Set Aside.
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Plaintiff appeared and defended himself at hearing on May 6, 2013. R015. The
transcript from this hearing shmvs Tangren intended to represent himself because the case
was "pretty cut and dry" and "self evident". 5/6/2013 Tr. at p. 10. Tangren argued that, in
2011, Plaintiff determined there needed to be a million dollar policy on the property and
$250,000 on the lodge, which Tangren agreed with. Id. at pp. 10-11. Tangren paid these
insurance amounts for a year and a half. Id. at p. 11. Then Plaintiff determined there needed
to be more than these policy limits and indicated the policy needed to be for $2 million and
then $3 million, which Tangren disagreed with. Id. Tangren indicated to the trial court, which
was undisputed, that he filed a case in Nevada to challenge Sharon Fiscus as the Trustee due
to the disagreement they were having regarding the insurance policies on the property. Id.
Tangren represented to the trial court that the fly-in, including the sky-diving and
airplanes, was discussed with the Nevada court, which ruled that $1 million policy was
sufficient. Id. Tangren indicated more things needed to be brought up with the Nevada
court. Id. at p. 13. Based on Tangren's representation that the property is worth $2 million,
the trial court ordered that Tangren obtain this in coverage or T angren could not have the
fly-in. Id. at p. 29. Further, as argued supra, the fact that Tangren was never served or had the
opportunity to object to the Temporary Order robbed Tangren of the ability to object to the
form and content of the Temporary Order, which was never served upon him, and then was
used as the basis of an order to show cause against him. This is particularly true when it is
considered that the content of the Temporary Order differs than the oral ruling of the trial
court.
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Generally, all that is needed for entry of a default is that a defendant has failed to
answer the complaint in a timely fashion . Roth at

i115. However,

the question of whether

Tangren "otherwise defended" in this case does not appear to have been addressed by an
appellate court. Thus, T angren has presented federal authority on the subject for this Court's
consideration.
While an appearance typically involves some presentation or submission to the trial
court, Tangren appeared in this case and indicated to both the trial court and Plaintiff a clear
purpose to defend the suit. Kry Bank at 353.

Further, since judgments by default are

generally disfavored, courts generally will attempt to determine whether there has been an
appearance by the defendant. Direct Niai! at 689.

In this case, Tangren did not fi le an answer prior to the entry of default. However,
Tangren did otherwise appear and defended himself against Plaintiffs' claims in the
temporary orders hearing, which was prior to the expiration of time in which to answer the
Complaint. Tangren's position at the temporary orders hearing evidenced his intent to the
trial court and to the Plaintiff that he had a clear purpose to defend himself, particularly
since Tangren indicated other things regarding Ms. Fiscus as Trustee needed to be addressed
in the Nevada court. Accordingly, Tangren otherwise defended himself in this case and
default judgment was improperly granted against him.

2. The Trial Court Erred By Entering Default Against Tangren
Because Plaintiffs' Well-Pled Facts Did Not Show Plaintiffs Were
Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law.
"Although 'a defendant's failure to appear warrants an entry of default,' it 'does not
automatically entitle a plaintiff to a default judg ment."' U?'isan v. Ciry of Hildale, 2014 UT 20,
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ill 7, 330 P.3d

76 citing Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1998). "A trial

court asked to render a judgment by default must first conclude that the uncontroverted
allegations of an app]jcant's petition are, on their face, legally sufficient to establish a valid
claim against the defaulting party." Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

citing Rajneesh Found. Int'l v. McGreer, 303 Or. 139, 142, 734 P.2d 871, 873 (1987) (according to
great weight of authority, default itself constitutes only admission that allegations are
factually true, not that they are legally sufficient to state a claim for reEef), rev'd on other

grounds, 303 Or. 371, 737 P .2d 593 (1987). In other words, "[e]ven though a defendant fails
to appear, a plaintiff is entitled to default judgment 'only if the well-pled facts show tl1at the
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Pennington v. Allrtate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d
932, 940 (Utah 1998) citing Skancl:y v. Calcados Ortope, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998).
"An original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim shall contain a
short and plain: (1) statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to reEef; and (2)
demand for judgment for specified relief." UT. R. CIV. P. 8(a). "A court may enter judgment
on the pleadings when the moving party is entitled to judgment on the face of the pleadings
themselves." Mountain America Credit Union v. l\/IcClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah App., 1993)

citing UTAH R.Clv.P. 12(c). "It must appear to a certainty that the [non-moving party] would
not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its
claim before a judgment on the pleading may be granted." Securities Credit Corp. v. Willry, 265
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah, 1953) citing Michel v. iVIeier, D.C., 8 F.R.D. 464.

In this case, Tangren failed to file an answer to the Complaint. However, this does
not automatically entitle Plaintiffs to the Default Judgment. Wisan at i 117. The trial court, was
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required to first conclude the uncontroverted allegations of the Plaintiffs' Complaint were,
on their face, legally sufficient to establish a valid claim against Tangren. Stevens at 595.
Plaintiff was only entitled to the D efault Judgment herein only if Plaintiffs' well-pled
facts showed it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pennington at 940. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs' claims were required to contain statements showing Plaintiffs were entitled to
relief and the appropriate demands for judgment for the specified relief. UT. R. Crv. P. 8(a).
The Complaint in this matter requested injunctive relief on the basis of the lack of insurance
on the property and Tangren bad refused to pay the insurance as required by the Lease.
R010. The Complaint alleges the Lease is attached to the Complaint; however, the Lease is
not attached to the Complaint, as evidenced by the record, nor was it filed separately. See, id.
The Complaint also alleges the breach of the Lease by Tangren for failure to pay the
insurance as required by the Lease and that Tangren bad failed to cure prior notices of
breach of the Lease. Id. The Complaint again alleges these notices and letters are attached to
the Complaint; however, these exhibits were not attached to the Complaint, as evidenced by
the record, nor were they filed as separate documents. See, id.
Plaintiffs were not entitled to judgment on the face of the Complaint itself. Niountain

America at 591. T angren appeared on May 6, 2013, argued against Plaintiffs' claims and even
argued that th.is case should be heard in Nevada, which presents a valid defense to Plaintiffs'
claims. Accordingly, it was not certain that Tangren would not be entitled to relief under any
state of facts that could be proved in support of his claim before a judgment on the
pleadings may be granted. Securities Credit at 424. Hence, the trial court erred by entering
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default against Tangren because Plaintiffs' facts did not show Plaintiffs were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

3. Tangren Has A Meritorious Defense To Plaintiffs' Claims.
'Judgments by default are not favored by the courts nor are they in the interest of
justice and fajr play." Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah, 1962) citing

Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111 (Utah, 1995); Nry v. Han·ison, 299 P .2d 11 14 (Utah, 1956).
"The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and complete
opportuni ty for a hearing on the meri ts of every case." Id "In the absence of prejudice, it is
appropriate to pursue that policy which favors resolution of disputes on the merits rather
than technicalities." Mryers v. Intenvest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah, 1981). "A defense is
suffici ently meritorious to have a default judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried."

Erickson v. Schenkers Int'/ Fonvarders) Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994).
While this argument was denied by the trial court in its denial of the Motion to Set
Aside, when viewed as one large whole herein, the default judgment should have been set
aside because it was not in the interest of justice or fair play. Heathman at 190. The D efault
Judgment in this case denied Tangren a complete opportunity for a hearing on the meri ts in

this case. Id. Plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment in its favor simply because of a
technicality. M01ers at 882. Further, Tangren's defense is that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs' claims regarding the insurance and rent were precluded by
collateral estoppel, and he had in fact complied with the Nevada Order to obtain insurance
on the property or that he did obtain the appropriate insurance during the pendency of the
case. These defenses are sufficiently meritorious and are entitled to be tried. Erickson at 1149.
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These defense s were presented to the trial court on May 6, 2013. Thus, default judgment was
improperly granted herein.
C. The Preliminary Injunction Did Not Comply With Rule 65(A) And Was

Wrongfully Issued.
"Every temporary restraining order . .. shall define the injury and state why it is
irreparable." UT. R. Clv. P. 65A(b)(2). "Every restraining ord er and order granting an
injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance. It shall be specific in terms and shall
describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the
act or acts sought to be restrained." UT. R. Crv. P. 65A(d).
Rule 65(A)(e) states as follows:
A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a showing
by the applicant that:
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction
issues;
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the
proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined;
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public
interest; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will p revail on the
merits of the underlying claim, o r the case presents seriou s issues on the
merits which should be the subject of further litigation.
"To prevail on a motion for p reliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish both its
standing and the requirements of the preliminary injunction." Southern Utah LVilderness Alliance

v. Thompson, 811 F.Supp 635, 640 (D. Utah, 1993).

A temporary restraining order that failed to define the injury and state why it was
irreparable, containing instead mere conclusory statements, and that failed to list the reasons
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for extending the order, was improperly granted. Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d
990, 994-995 (Utah, 1993). In the case of System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, the Utah Supreme
Court determined that a trial court had not addressed the standards of Rule 65A in its
findings and therefore erred as a matter of law. Ibid., 669 P.2d 421, 429 (Utah, 1983).

In this case, Plaintiffs did not file an actual motion for injunctive relief but instead
includes this request in the Complaint. R010. The Complaint alleges Plaintiffs had no other
adequate remedy at law or otherwise due to the threatened harm of the fly-in and alleges
irreparable harm. See, Complaint at p. 4, il~16-17. The Plaintiffs also filed an Affidavit from
Ms. Fiscus to support the request. R003. The trial court issued an order on the same date as
the filing of the Complaint, which ordered T angren to appear for hearing for temporary
orders to determine whether Tangren should be enjoined from allowing the fly-in, whether
Tangren should be ordered to obtain liability insurance for the property, and setting a date
for hearing to consider an order of restitution. R012.
After hearing on May 6, 2013, Plaintiffs prepared a proposed temporary order, which
was filed with the trial court on May 7, 2013, and which was signed by the trial court on May
8, 2013. R017. There is no certificate of mailing for the Temporary Order but it does
indicate that it would be served upon Tangren. However, as discussed supra, there is no
evidence in the record that the Temporary Order was ever served on Tangren. The
Temporary Order found Tangren did not have liability insurance for the fly-in, that the value
of the policy he was ordered to obtain was $2 million, and ordered Tangren to obtain the
insurance or he could not have the fly-in as scheduled. R01 7.
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The Temporary Order in this case does not define the injury

to

Plaintiff and why it is

irreparable. UT. R. CIV. P. 65A(b)(2). T he Temporary Order does not set fo rth the reasons
for its issuance, is non-specific in terms, and fails to describe, in reasonable detail, the act or
acts sought to be restrained. UT. R. CIV. P . 65A(d).
As the appkant for the temporary restraining order, Plaintiffs were required to
establish the requirements of a temporary restraining order. Southern Utah Wilderness at 640.
Plaintiffs were required to demonstrate 1) irreparable harm, 2) the threatened injury to
Plaintiffs outweighed any damage

to

Tangren, 3) the order would not be adverse to the

public interest, and; 4) there is a substantial likelihood Plaintiffs would prevail on the merits
of the underlying claims or the Plainti ffs had presented serious issues on the merits that
would be the subject of further litigation. See, Rule 65A(e). Plaintiffs failed to establish how
the harm was irreparable, the threatened injury to Plaintiffs outweighed any damage to
Tangren, failed to address the effect upon the public interest, and failed to allege there was a
substantial likelihood Plaintiffs would prevail on the merits of its underlying claims against
Tangren. Id.
None of the elements required by Rule 65A(e) were addressed by the T emporary
Order and it constitutes wrongfully issued injunction. Birch Creek at 994-995. The T emporary
O rder in this case contains conclusory statements and fails to list the reasons for the
enjoinment. Id. The Temporary Order does not address the standards pursuant to Rule 65A
and therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law. System Concepts at 429.
These foregoing procedural deficiencies in this case prohibited Tangren from fully
realizing the exact nature of the pending proceedings against him. Additionally, based upon
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the requirements of Rule 65A, the Temporary Order was improperly entered.

Therefore,

when viewed as one large whole, the circumstances of this case warranted setting aside the
default judgment and Writ of Restitution based upon excusable neglect or as a reason
justifying relief from said orders pursuant to Rule 60(6)(1) and (6). Accordingly, the trial
court abused its discretion in this matter and the Judgment in this case should be reversed.

D . The Trial Court Erred By Denying The Motion To Set Aside.
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the trial court failed to further justice by
relieving T angren of the default judgment and Writ of Restitution in this case. UTAH R. CIV.
P. 60(6). T his case amounts to excusable neglect based upon the insufficient summons,
Plaintiffs' failure to abide by Rule 5, the manner in which default was entered, and the entry
of the wrongful injunction. Further, the Motion to Set Aside was filed within a reasonable
time of the entry of the default judgment. Id.
T he circumstances of this matter arise to an abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court, when it denied the Motion to Set Aside and declined to exercise the equitable
nature of excusable neglect. .Jones at

ir

17. The trial court failed to take into account all

relevant factors in light of the facts of this case, particularly since setting aside the default
judgment is justified under the principles of fundamental fairness herein. Id.
T angren has established excusable neglect and presented evidence to justify the relief.

.Jones at~ 20. Under the circumstances of this case as described above, Tangren exercised due
diligence by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances. U:7hite Cap at

iI

5.

T angren exercised diligence upon realizing default had entered in November of 2013.
Tangren's actions in this case were sufficiently diligent and responsible, in light of the
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attendant circumstances herein, which justifies excusing him from the full consequences of
his neglect. Jones at

il

20. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in the denial of the

Motion to Set Aside and reversal is warranted.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant Rodney Tangren respectfully
requests the reversal of the denial of the Motion to Set Aside, direct further proceedings, and
any other such relief this Court determines to be necessary and appropriate.
DATE D this

lo~ day of April, 2015.
OANE PAPPAS WHITE
Attorney for Rodney Tangren

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH R. APP. P. 24(f)(l)(C)
Counsel hereby certifies the Opening Brief of Appellant complies with the type-volume
limitation: 13,219 words are contained herein, in compliance with UTAH R. APP. P. (f)(l)(A)
and was determined by the word processing system used to prepare Opening Brief ofAppellant.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2015.

~ea~~
~
PAPASWHITE
Attorney for Rodney Tangren
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify tb at I mailed a true and correct copy, postage pre-paid, of the
foregoing Opening Brief of Appellant, with attachments, on this 6 th day of April, 2015, to the
following:

•

Craig C. Halls
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appeilee
403 South Main Street
Blanding, Utah 84511

44 of 56

Addendum "A" - The Lease

45 of 56

Addendum "B" -The Nevada Court Ruling

46 of 56

Addendum "C" - Docket of 2012 Case,
#120700005

47 of 56

Addendum "D" - Complaint

48 of 56

•

•
Addendum "E" - Summons

49 o f 56

•
Addendum "F" - All Returns of Service Filed by
Plaintiff

•
•

50 of 56

Addendum "G" - Temporary Restraining Order

51 o f 56

•
Addendum "H" - District Court Docket of This
Case

•

52 of 56

Addendum "I" - Proposed Orders Filed by
Plaintiffs in Obtaining Default

53 of 56

Addendum

"J" -

54 of 56

Ruling

Addendum "IZ" - Final Order

55 of 56

Addendum "L" Martin v. Nelson (Unpublished
Case)

56 of 56

n.B~f!.IB-~,
!J't;fr,l oi?~s
F111
32.00 Chick

-;

UlJISE C JONES, Recorder
. Filed J}y L_CJ
For RODNEY TANGREN
SAN JUAN COUNTY CORPORATION

LEASE AGREEMENT

Lease Agreement ("Lease" or "Aareement") made on

-,,b~tw~

~ • by

@~ ,.__r~CL'-7

J frllfjru. -1::t:un, ly I Cl'£ f
and,

-- ✓

'. and ,

..,,-

L

, Trustee of

. - (h~reinafter called
®~- 7a-n,u-r,;...,_,

,.

0

"Lessor")

~rasbund -M&-

~

,wa.,e (hereinafter called "Lessee"}.

WITNESSETH:

That for and
DOLIARS

in consideration of the sum of One Hundred

($100.00),

acknowledged,

the

receipt

and

sufficiency

of

which

is

Lessor and Lessee hereby agree that Lessor shall

lease to Lessee,

and Lessee shall

property described hereinbelow,

lease

from

Lessor the real

upon and subject to the terms,

conditions and covenants set forth herein.
1.

-~- '

y

~i;tsr,}_-,t_(I
I

,-, e-

1

I __ . ,

. , _ ,- 1 ,

r ;r . , , ,

'

·-·- -- -...

.-,}

..

_._

·. ··,. ~-!'i

a,p~~. .•

'

:..~
,~)~iRP. 'i .qf·. Lease:
.

l

:PJl . -~
. ·,

,..

whkmev~r .-oecurs first,

I

The

term of tbis

Le~s'e sh~ll

1991, or upon d•i!.v.ary of

p.Q8flffSion,

and unless it comes to an end sooner by

operation of the provisiomi contained herein or by operation of
law,

-s hal.l

continue

for

a

term

which

oacurk ~ ~fa default by Lessee or on

shall

/41,

terminate on the

~'

2090.

2
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oooe.

Possession:

4.

Lessee

Lessor and Lessee acknowledge that

is currently in possession of the Property and shall continue in
possession hereafter pursuant to this Agreement.

Rental:

5.

Lessee shall pay to Lessor a monthly rent of

I .S::D · 00 )
•

("$

of

each

calendar

month

(tha

due and payable on the 1st day

"Due Date")

rental payment.
the

sal!le

estimated
calendar

Lessee

date

annual
year.

shall

and

taxes
For

pay

In addition each month on

one-twelfth

insurance

in _._1-991

example

beginning with the

for

(l/12)

the

the

then

estimated

of

the

current
annual

insurance cost is

$_d,~~-~Q and the estimated cost for real

property taxes

$

is

9So -~ '-.)

During calendar year 1992 each

monthly payment to Les11or will include an amount equal to the sum
of one-twelfth (1/12) of each of these estimated annual costs, or

in 199f the sum of $_L}.. •$~. . ::,~~ monthly.
payment made to Lessor shal 1 be $
monthly

rent

and

one-twelfth

Thus in 199~ each monthly

iil, ?S ~~

( 1/12)

of

being the sum of the

each

of the estimated

annual costs.
All payments shall be made to Lessor at

3/l't,
. E

Ck~

ted.
Ten days prior to .January
each ca en ar year or as soon thereafter as the estimated annual
costs for taxes and insurance can be ascertained,

Lessor shall

provide to Lessee the calculated sum to be paid monthly for said
costs

in

addition

to

the

$_ _

per

month

rental payment.

Upon notice Lessee shall increase or decrease the total monthly
3
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payment beginning with the first payment due subsequent to the
notice.

If Lessor fails to provide such notice then the monthly

payment

shall

in

continue

the

amount

paid

in

the

previous

calendar year until such notice is provided. . Any special taxes

or assessment which become due during the term hereof shall be
Lessee upon demand by

t

7.

:

Lessor

shall

be

responsible for paying out of the monthly estimated swn received

from

Lessee

pursuant

to

paragraph

5

all

real

property

tax

assessed against the Property during the term of the Lease and
the insurance.
8.

pay

Utilities:

directly

to

Lessee shall be responsible for and shall

the

suppliers

all

charges

for

electricity,

sewage, gas and all other utilities and services used on or in
connection with the Property during the term of this Lease and

during any period of occupancy of the Property before or atter
such term.
9.

Eyents of

Default:

In any one or more of the following

cases, or in any one or more of the cases that elsewhere in this
Lease may be made subject to this provision,

Lessor shall have

just cause to do so and may declare Lessee in default if Lessee:
(a)

neglects to timely perform any of its payments or
other obligations under this Lease;

(b)

whether

vo lunta ril y

unable to meet

or

involuntarily,

becomes

its financial obligations as t h e y

mature;
4
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•
(c)

becomes insolvent; or

(d)

vacates the property and leaves it vacant for a
period

in

excess

of

thirty

days

without prior

approval from Lessor.

Termination of I&ase Upon Default:

10.

default as described in Section 9 above,

In the event of a

Lessor may elect to

terminate this Lease upon ten (10) days notioe to Lessee and to

demand and to receive the immediate surrender of the Property as
well as the immediate payment of all amounts then due from Lessee

to Lessor by law and under this Lease, without prejudice to all
such other rights and remedies as may exist by law under this
Lease, but reserving to Lessee the benefits of Section 11 below

in a case where they apply.

Lessee's Cure of De;fault:

11.

Without prejudice to the

provisions of this Lease regarding rights and remedies and the
resolution
without

of

claims,

limiting

controversies,

the

provisions to Lessor,

concurrent

demands

or

availability

disputes
of

all

and
such

it Lessor seeks to terminate this Lease

upon a default in the payment of rent, taxes or other sum payable
under

this

Lease

or

upon

any

other

default

which

Lessee

reasonably and promptly can correct, Lessor shall give Lessee ten
(10} days notice to correct such default, and such notice shall
not

take

effect

at

the

end

of

such

ten

( 10)

days

if

Lessee

corrects the default in the interim.

5
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12.

Assignment

I',,essee:

by

This

Lease

is

personal

to

Lessee,. and Lessee does __.;._ have the right to assign or transfer

this Lease.

13.

Assignment

by

Lessor:

This Lease or the paYJilents due

Lessor hereunder may· be assigned.

Lessor has the right to set up

a collection account and Lessee up(?n notice agrees to make all
sUbsequent p~ynients to such collection account as directed.
14.

Governing Law:

The law applicabl.e to the performance

of this Lease shall be the law of the State of Utah.

15.

Notioe of Lease:

Lessee may record this Lease, or upon

the request of Lessee, Lessor shall prepare and execute a Notice
of Lease which Lessee may record at i ta expense.

Lessee shall

deliver a copy of any such recorded Notice of Lease to Lessor.

16.

No other Assy~ances:

reliance

upon

its

Lessee

provisions,

makes

including

this
any

Lease

in

amendments,

supplements and extensions, and not in reliance upon any alleged
assurances,

representations

and warranties made by

Lessor,

or

Lessor's agents, servants or employees.
17.

18.

Amendments

in

Writing:

.No

alleged

modification,

termination or waiver of this Lease shall be binding unless it is
set out in writing and sign ed by the parties hereto.

6
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given,

Where

Notices:

19.

this

Lease

requires

notice

to

be

except where it expressly provides to the contrary, all

such notices shall be in writing and (except for those that are

delivered

by

hand)

shall

be

deemed

given

when

mailed

by

registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, or when sent by
telegram or cable, addressed to the party or Guarantor entitled

to receive the notice at his or its address as provided for such
purpose in this Lease or at such other address as the party or
Guarantor to receive the notice last may have designated for such
purpose by notice given to the other party.
20.

Addresses for Notices: The addresses for notices and

payments are:

LESSOR:

€' ~ f),...... ~ wd.,
/....~ ,;~......., ~ - ?°$-1"'7'

3JI 'f

LESSEE:
3 ~ ~} E C ' ~$rb-...... l9·J.,·l

~va,-~..,r
21 .

Attorney Fees:

In the event it becomes necessary for

any party to employ an attorney to enforce the terms of this
Agreement or protect his rights,
entitled

to

the prevailing party shall be

reasonable attorney fees and court costs incurred

thereby.

has

22.

Brokers:

not

utilized

Each party represents to the other that it
the

services of

any

real

estate

broker

connection herewith.
7
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in

- ·,em 6£

-En~t~.r-eiw 1Jefi"2t111MtW'iiih~

p,a2w .ga@AA,Wli~ -

I

IN WI'l'NESS WHEREOF, the parties have exeeuted this Agreement
as of the date first above written.
LESSOR:

LESSEE:

STATE OF NEVADA
COUNTY OF CLARK

)
)
)

ss:

on this ~ d a y of
pereonallYi appeared before me, a
...---'----'

who acknowled~&°'°"t:1:];0<u

foregoing Lease Agreement.

STATE OF NEVADA
ss:
COUNTY OF CLARK

~

On this
day of,.,..-t:O~:;::..._,.,_-,---,,_ - - - - "
personally anneared before me, cy-'Nota
___ ,

who acknow),.edged

~oregoing Lease. Agreement.

I

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF N5VAOA
·
County of Clar!<

8

A

Petrlcia Crickonberr.er

I

?olntmont E;cp1rr.~ Dec . ..,2 fr. .,
:::-----.!:_:_ . .:.'..9~

E 0G4128 B 797 P 0012
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_c\octenc
rtrn ''B··:, - r-I-1h e N
J. e·va d a C0 1-1rt R_u 1ing
1

'

~-6 of 56

Electronicafy Filed

06122/2012 03:50:39 PM

'

~j.~

I STI»
ELtSE M. TYRELL, ESQ.

•

CLERK OF THE COURT

2

Nevada Bar No: 5531

3

TRENT, TYRELL & ASSOCIATES
11920 Southern Highlands
Parkway, Suite 200

4

Las Vegas, NevAda 89141

Phone:
5

Fax:

(702) 3~2-2210
(702) 382-9242

elyse@probatelawlv.com

6 Attorney for RODNEY TANGREN
7

DISTRIC'J! cotmT
CT,J,BJf cotnft! , DV1IJ)A

8
In the Matter of
THE EXEMPTION TRUST OF THE
10 TANGREN FAMILY TRUST Dated Apr-il
1, 1985

9

lJ

__________________
An Intervivos Trust

12

) CASE NO.

P-11-071373

) DEPT:

H

)
)
)
)
)

13

QRDP !Rf!' CQOBT

14

Data of Bearing: 08/03/12
Ti.me o~ Baari119: 9:30 a.m.

15

This matter having come on for hearing on the 3 rd day of

16

August, 2012, based upon the Petition Removal of Successor Trustee,
17

tiled by RODNEY TANGREN, which was originally on this court's

18
19

20

calendar for June 29, 2012.

During the June 29th hearing, this

court granted SHARON TANGl:lEN FISCUS, a continuance until August 3,
2012, in an effort to afford her an opportunity to respond to the

21

22
23
24

Petition for Removal of Successor Trustee; SHARON TANGREN fISCUS
having filed an Objection to the Petition for Removal of Successor
Trustee; RODNEY TANGREN having filed a response to that objection;
at the August 3, 2012, the court having noted the presence of ELYSE

25

26

M. TYRELL, ESQ ., and her client , RODNEY TANGREN, as we l l as the

presence of PHILIP VAN ALSTYNE, ESQ., and his client, SHARON
27

28

1

1 TANGREN

rrscos,

the parties having discussed the issues raised in

2 the petition, objection and response; ~he parties having reached
3

an agreement; the court having heard the statements of counsel and

4

good cause appear therefor;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is

5

6 hereby continued until Friday, February 8, 2013, at 9:30 a.m.; and
7 it is

FURTHER ORDERED that RODNEY TANGREN and SHARON TANGREN FISCOS

8

9 a~e hereby directed to drop the pending litigation in the Seate of
10 Utah; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that RODNEY TANGREN shall maKe arrangements to

11

12 immediately secure a $1,000,000.00 liability insurance policy on
13 the Trust property and shall provide SHARON TANGREN FISCUS with
14 evidence of the same; and it is

15

EURTHER ORDERED that RODNEY TANGREN shall bear the expense

16 associa~ed with the liability insurance policy and shall make
17 certain that the premiums are kept current; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that RODNEY TANGREN and SHARON TANGREN FISCUS,

18

19 by and through ELYSE M. TYRELL, ESQ., shall discuss the clean up of

20 the hazardous waste on the Utah property and shall discuss the
21

Trust's responsibility associated the cost of the clean up; and it

22

is

23

FURTHER ORDERED that SHARON TANGREN FISCUS shall not increase

24

the rent on the Utah property without giving RODNEY TANGREN

25

sufficient notice, through ELYSE M. TYRELL, ESQ.; and it is

26

FURTHER ORDERED that , should the r e need to be an increase

27 in the rent, SHARON TANGREN FISCUS shall provide RODNEY TANGREN

28

2

1 with docwnentation and evidence as to why the increase is

2 necessary.
3
DATED and DONE this

_

f-

_E_ day

of August, 2012.

4

5

DISTRICT COURT J U ~

6

7

TRENT, TYRELL & ASSOCIATES

8

l:EL~tu
11

11920 Southern Highlands
Parkway, Suite 201
Las Vegas, NV 89141

12
13

14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25
26
27

28

3

1 ,::, r·· r1u1-n
1cJ\~
1 ~~L
,._J_

,
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ITH DISTRICT COURT- MONTICELLO
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TANGREN FAMILY TRUST vs. RODNEY TANGREN
CASE NUMBER 120700005 Eviction

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
LYLE R ANDERSON
PARTIES

Plaintiff - TANGREN FAMILY TRUST
Repracotcd by: CRAIG C HALLS

Dcfcnda.nt- RODNEY TANGREN
Represented by: CHRISTOPHER G MCANANY
Trustee - SHARON FISCUS
Rq,rcscntcd by: CRAIG C HALLS
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE AmoUIU Due:
Amount Paid:
360.00

Credit:
Balance:

360.00

0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT IOK-MORE
Amount Due:
360.00
Amount Paid:
360.00
Amount Ocdit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
CASE NOTE

PROCEEDINGS
03--01-12 Case filed
03-01-12 Judge LYLE R ANDERSON assigned.
03--01-12 Filed: COMPLAINT
03--01-12 Fee Account created
Total Due:
360.00
03--01-12 COMPLAINT IOK-MORE
Paymc:nt ~cived:

No<c: Code Description: COMPLAINT !OK-MORE
03-12-12 Filed: ANSWER ANSWER

RODNEY TANGREN

Printed: 12/03/ 13 10:17:46

Page I

360.00

CASE NUMBER 12070000.5 Eviction

03- 14-12 Filed J"C1Uffl: SUMMONS
Pany Served: TANGREN, RODNEY
Seivice Type: Personal
Service Dale: March 08, 2012

08-23-12 Filed: MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
Filed by: HAUS, CRAIG C

08-23-12 Filed order: ORD.ER OF DISMISSAL
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON
Signed August 23, 2012
08-23-12 Case Disposition is Dismsd w/o prejudice
Disposition Judge is LYLE R ANDERSON

Primed: 12/03/ 13 10:17:46

Pngc 2 (hist)

-" dden d·
,n . t
_u1n "D" - r\_;ompla1n.,

.:. .i. _
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CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
Attorney for Plaintiff
333 South Main Street
Blanding, Utah 84511
Telephone: (435)678-3333
Facsimile: (435)678-3330

lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE TANGREN FAMLIY TRUST,
SHARON FISCUS, TRUSTEE
Petitioner,

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION
AND ORDER OF RESTITUTION.

vs.

RODNEY TANGREN,

Civil No.
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Respondent.

COMES NOW, THE TANGREN FAMLIY TRUST and for cause of action alleges as
follows:

1.

Plaintiff is in at all times mentioned is a trust formed in the State of Nevada with
ownership of property in San Juan County State of Utah.

2.

Defendant at all times mentioned was a resident of the County of San Juan, State
of Utah. Jurisdiction is appropriate in San Juan County, State of Utah because the
Defendant lives in San Juan County, State of Utah and the activities, which arc
requested to be restrained, are occurring in San Juan County, State of Utah.

3.

Background facts:
injur1cti1111cc,mplai11t wpcl

-··- - - ·-·- --

4.

Richard Tangren, Trustee of the Tangren Family Trust entered into a lease
agreement on February 24 1h 1994 for the 99 year lease of properties in San Juan
County (Exhibit A) more particularly described as:
Parcel I : All that certain lot, piece and parcel of land lying situate and being in
San Juan County and known as the NE 1/4 NE 1/4, section 12, T27S, R20E,
SLBM, containing 40 acres, more or less.
27S 20E 12 000
Parcel 2: All that certain lot, piece and parcel of land lying situate and being in
San Juan County and being described as follows: E ½ of the SE 1/4 SE 1/4, SE
l /4 NE 1/4 SE 1/4, Section 1, T27S, R20E, SLBM. Lots 11 and 12, Section 6;
Lot 2, Section 7; T27S R2IE, SLBM. Township 37 South, Range 19 East, SLBM,
Section 16: San Juan County.
27S 20E 01 7200
27S 21 E 06 6000
27 S21E 07 3000

5.

As part of the lease agreement, Respondent, Rodney Tangren, agreed to pay all
taxes and insurance which may be needed to protect the property, the lessee and
the owner. (Sec Paragraph 5 and 7 of the lease attached as Exhibit A).

6.

On several occasions in 2011 and 2012 the Petitioner obtained and attempted to
obtain liability insurance on the premisses and notified Respondent of the cost of
the coverage.

7.

On several occasions from 2009 to the present Respondent has hosted or allowed
others to have a "Fly In" at the Cave Man Ranch. The "Fly In" involved several
aircraft flying into the Ranch for a weekend of airplane games, shooting, and
socializing.

8.

Some of the participants paid or donated money to the Petitioner or paid camping
fees for the activity.

injunc1ioncomplain1. wpd

Respondent has asserted he receives no compensation for

2

the activity.
9,

On May 24 -27, 2013 another activity is planned for the ranch which involves
aircraft landing on the dirt field at the ranch. The organizer has stated in social
media that the number of "visitors" expected is approximately 200.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
10.

The activity (aircraft takeoff and landing) exposes the owner to liability if
someone where to become hurt or an accident were to occur.

11.

The owner is to be protected, at least in part, pursuant to the lease agreement by
the obtention of insurance. The responsibility for the payment of the insurance is
to Respondent. The determination of what insurance is required is left to
Petitioner.

12.

Petitioner has notified that the activities planned are objectionable and should not
be conducted without the protection of insurance and has requested Respondent to
pay for such coverage and respondent has refused.

13.

There is no liability insurance in place presently which insures the contemplated
activity and an activity involving numerous aircraft utilizing the dirt airstrip at
Cave Man Ranch is scheduled for May 24-27.

14.

To the best of Petitioners knowledge, Respondent is not employed and docs not
own sufficient property or assets to cover liability if the activities he is allowing
on the property should result in injury to a participant or guest

15.

Respondents course of conduct in refusing to obtain appropriate insurance and

injunctioncomplaint wpd

upon insisting on conducting activities which are dangerous subject the owner to
extreme liability and are knowing, and willfully in violation of the lease, and
without legitimate purpose.
16.

Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law or otherwise, for the harm or damage
threatened to be done, by Respondent. Respondent has no ability to ''self insure"
the potential harm. While many of the issues may be compensated by financial
award, Respondent is unable to respond in a financial way to the risk, or to
assume the risk.

The Respondent's refusal to pay the premium for the activities

he is conducting or allowing has no legitimate purpose and is exposing Petitioner
to a harm for which there is no adequate remedy.
17.

Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm, damage and injury, unless the acts and
conduct of defendant described above are enjoined . Respondent does not have
the financial ability to resolve Petitioners complaints short of obtaining insurance
or discontinuing the activity.

BREACH OF LEASE
18.

Insurance to protect the owner is provided for in the lease agreement and
Petitioners have notified Respondent that he must obtain appropriate insurance for
the "Fly In" activity but Respondent has refused.

19.

Petitioner has notified Respondent of arrears in the payment of fire insurance for
2011 and Respondent has failed to pay the amount of $592.66. Respondent has
failed to pay an amount in arrears for 2012 in the amount of $397.10. Respondent

injunctioncomrlaint.wptl

has been notified and requests have been made for the payment of $989.76 which
have remained uncomplied with,
20.

Respondent is responsible for the payment of insurance premiums pursuant to the
lease. (Paragraphs 5 and 7).

21.

Petitioner is given the authority to obtain appropriate insurance on the properties
and for liability at the expense of Respondent. (Paragraph 7) Petitioner has
notified Respondent of the need and increase in insurance obligation and
Respondent has refused to pay for the additional amounts in breach of the lease
agreement.

PRIOR BREACH OF LEASE
22.

In 2011 Petitioner notified Respondent of various breaches of the lease agreement.
A copy of the notice(s) is provided as exhibit B and C. The violations remained

uncomplied with and Respondent is in default of the lease agreement in
accordance with the prior notice.
23.

Respondent was notified of insurance premiums that were not paid and also of an
increase in the payment to reflect the insurance by letters dated November 5, 201 I
(Exhibit D) and December 7, 2011 (Exhibit E).

24.

On January 10th, 2012 Defendant was notified that he was in default in the amount
of $534.75, which constituted the payment for the insurance for September,
October, November, December and January. Copy of the January 101\ 2012 letter
is attached hereto as Exhibit r.

inJunctioncomplaint. wpd

25.

On February 3rd 2012 Defendant was sent a Notice of Termination and Forfeiture
of Lease and Demand for Delivery of Possession. The notice was sent lo Rodney
Tangren Caveman Ranch, P.O. Box 1705, Moab, Utah 84532, which is an address
that had previously been agreed by Rodney Tangren as being the appropriate
address for service of Notices. Mr. Tangren has been given in excess of ten (10)
days in which to cure the default in the payment of the insurance owed on the
property in the amount of $534.75 and failed to do so. (Exhibit G)

26.

Plaintiff has notified Defendant, pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Lease Agreement,
of the increase of insurance and taxes. Defendant is liable, pursuant to paragraph
6 for the payment of "any special taxes or assessments which become due during
the term hereof shall be paid by Lessee upon demand by Lessor"

27.

Defendant has failed, pursuant to paragraph 9 to timely perform his obligation to
pay taxes and insurance in addition to the lease payments.

28.

Defendant has been notified, pursuant to paragraph 10 of the Lease Agreement, of
his failure to make the payments or to cure, as provided in paragraph 10, and has
failed to cure pursuant to the ten (10) day grace period allowed under paragraph
11.

29.

Under the terms of the Lease Agreement, Plaintiff has the right to recover
possession of the property for Dcfondants failure to timely pay the rent, taxes and
insurance, or to cure the default pursuant to the four (4) notices attached.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays a restraining order issued as follows:

inju11cl irm,11111plainl wpJ
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Enjoining the Respondent from allowing or engaging in the "Fly In" activity
scheduled for the 24-27 of May, 201 3.

2,

Enjoining Respondent from cn~ai;ing in any futurt activity which CX}'Q!'Cd the
owner to liability until the appropriate insurance is obtained,

3.

Allowing the Petitioner to obtain appropriate insurance but requiring Respondent
to pay the cost of the insurance in accordance with the lease.

4.

For plaintiffs cost and expenses incurred in this action,

5.

Ruling that the lease agreement is in default in accordance with the original notice
of default or alternatively that the agreement is in breach for the current failure to
obtain. or pay for the current insurance and obtain appropriate insurance.

6.

That the Court enter a Writ of Rcstitut:ion, ordering the Defendant to be removed
from the property and allowing Petitioners to re-enter and take possession of the
property.

7,

For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper and just in the

circumstances.

Dated this _jg_ Day of {Lt'Jri
J
i

2013.

SHARON FISCUS

inj unct ioncomplain1.wpd
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The Order of Court i4 mtcd below:
Dated: April 23, 2013
/,J Lyle

04:26: 11 PM

Disttl

CRAIG C. HALLS
Attorney for Petitioner
333 South Main Street
Blanding, Utah 84511

Telephone: 678-3333
Bar Counsel No. 1317
TN TiiE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUOJCtAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE TANGREN FAM1L Y TRUST, 10 DAY SUMMONS
SHARON FISCUS, TRUSTEE
Petitioners,
vs.
RODNEY TANGREN. Civil No.

Judge Lyle R. Anderson
Respondents.
THE STATE OF UTAH TO TIIE ABOVE•NAMED DEFENDANT:
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer to the anru:hed Complaint in writing with
the Clerk of the above--entitled Court at, 296 S Main Monticello, Utah 84535, and to serve upon, or
mail to Craig C. Halls, Plaintiffs attorney, 333 South Main Street. Blanding, Utah 84511, a copy of
said answer, within IO days after service of this summons upon you.
If you fail so to do.judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in said
complaint, which has bcc:n fikd with the Clerk of said court and a copy of which is hereto annexed
and herewith served upon you.

Serve Upon:
Rodney Tangren
Caveman Ranch
1959 Caveman Way

Moab, UT 84532

SERVICE COPY
April 23, 2013 04:26 PM
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RETURN OF SERVICE
GRAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
STATE OF UTAH
)S.S.

COUNlY OF GRAND)
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I bel1!by make n:cmn oftiefVice and certify that:
1.

I an duly quali6cd and 11:tiq Peace Officer or am a perlOl1 c,ver me aae of21 ,an and am not a part to the action.

2.

I lftwd
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□ Wimcss

3.
□

Type of

~efendant

□ Plaintiff □ Rc.pondc:ot

O Third Pany O Other_ _ _ _ _ _ __

frocess;

Summons and Complaint I Verified Petition
□ Ex-Parte Protective Order and Verified Petition
0 Motion & Supplemental Order □ Protective Order □ Beru:h Warrant
D Small Claims
D Temporary~ Order/Request for Temporary Protective Order )lll;Order to Show Cause
0 Bench Warrant poticc of Hearing for / , &4-.,<- ,!(':,J--,L.:z-~,,,.-?-c□

□

Noticcoflncomins Withholding □ Declaration of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ □ Subpoena
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s.
6.

Serving a Company or Corporation:_ _ __ __ _ __

_
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_ _ _ _ __

_

_ __ _ _ location_
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_

_

p>✓6201 _1:_

_ __ __ _ __ _ _ __
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STATE Of UI'AH
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□ Ex-Pa.rte Proicctivc Order and Verified Petition
D Motion & Supplemental Order □ Protective Order □ Bcoch warrant
□ Small Claims
D Order to Show Cause

□

Bench Wammt

□ Notice of Hearing for__,,,,_ _ _ _ _ _ __
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Service Fee: _ _ __

_ __

_

3o

□ Police Offic«

0

day of

Office Adminismltioo

Sul,tcrtNd and moni bd'Oft m, dl.ll _ _day of _ _ _Yau-_ _

Nowy PuhUc

1
"G" -- T emporary Restra1n1ng
. . 0 r der
A_cic..1enG·Ln11
j

-,

51 of 56

CRAIG C. HALLS # 1317
333 South Main Street
Blanding, Utah 84511
Telephone: (435)678-3333
Facsimile: (435)678-3330
Attorney for Petitioners
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SEVENTH JUDIC IAL DISTRICT
SAN JUAN COUNTY
THE TANGREN FAMILY TRUST,
SHARON FISCUS, TRUSTEE
Petitioner(s)

ORDER ON TEMPORARY ORDERS
I

I Case Number 13070001 2

I

VS.

Judge Name Lyle R. Anderson

RODNEY TANGREN
R.espondent(s)

i
i
'

This matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of May, 20 13. The Tangren Family Trmt
was present and represented by Sharon Fiscus, T rustee and Craig Halls attorney for the Trust and
the Trustee. Rodney Tangren was present and represented himself. The Court having heard
testimony and proffer of the parties with regard with the situation on insurance, and having
reviewed the lease, and an Orde r of the Nevada Court, find s that:
1. Rodney Tangren does not have li ability insurance for the use of the air strip,
fly ing activ ities, skydiv ing activities or for charter or flights into Caveman Ranch.
2. The Court finds that Rodney Tangren may have homeowners insurance on the
Lodge and that insurance does not protect all liab ility for all activities.
3. The Court find s that the va lue of the Ranch, as expressed by Rodney Tangren,

1
ta ngren. ord.temp.wpd
May 08, 2013 03:22 PM

1 c,i 2

is $2_,000,000.
4. The Court finds that it is reasonable to order Rodney Tangren to cease and
desist himself or through any other party from any fly-in activity, especially that scheduled for
the Caveman Ranch on May 24th through 27th and from any further use of the airstrip, the use of
the Caveman Ranch as a destination, or drop zone for skydiving activities and for other charter
or activities involving guests until liability insurance is obtained.
WHEREFORE: The Court does hereby order that Rodney Tangren is enjoined
from organizing or allowing the use of the airstrip at Caveman Ranch, or the landing of aircraft,
and from any other airstrip activities, from skydiving activities or from any other use of the
airstrip by any other carrier or aircraft company until he has obtained and provided the Trustee
with proof of liability insurance covering the entire property in an amount at least equal to
$2,000,000.
This order means that Mr. Tangren shall not make arrangements himself or allow
any other party to make arrangements for the use of the premises for the above described
activities.

Serve upon:
Rodney Tangren
Caveman Ranch
1959 Caveman Way
Moab, UT 84532

2

ta ngren.ord.temp.wpd
May 08, 201 3 03:22 PM
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7TH DISTRICT COURT- MONTICELLO
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
APPEALED: CASE #20140938
THE TANGREN FAMI LY TRUST vs . RODNEY TANGREN
CASE NUMBER 130700012 Contracts

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
LYLE R ANDERSON
PARTIES
Plaintiff -

THE TANGREN FAMILY TRUST

Represented by : CRAIG C HALLS
Plaintiff - SHARON FISCUS
Represented by: CRAIG C HALLS
De f endant - RODNEY TANGREN
Represented by : JOANE P WHITE
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

J>..rnou nt Due:

596 . 86

Amou nt Paid :

596 . 86

Credit:

0 . 00

Balance :

0 . 00

BAIL/CASH BONDS

Posted :

30 0 .00

Forfeited:

0 . 00

Refunded:

0.00

Balance:
300 . 00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT s
Amount Due :
360.00
Amount Paid:

360 . 00

Amount Credit:

0 .00

Balance :

0 .00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:

10 . 00

Amount Paid:

10.00

Amount Credit :

0 . 00

Balance :

0 . 00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE : POSTAGE-COPIES
Amount Due :

1 . 86

Amount Paid:

1 . 86

Amount Credit :
Frinted : 04/06/ 15 08 :1 3 :0 4
Page 1

0 . 00
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CASE NUMBER 130700012 Contracts
Balance :

0 . 00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:

225 . 00

Amount Paid :

225 . 00

A.mount Credit:

0 . 00

Balance :

0.00

BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE : CASH BOND : Appeals
Posted By : JOANE P WHITE
Posted:

300.00

Forfeited:

0.00

Refunded :

0.00

Balance :

300 . 00

PROCEEDINGS
04 -23-13 Filed : Complaint
04 - 23-13 Filed: Affidavit
04 -23 - 13 Filed : Other Proposed : Order (Proposed)
04-23-13 Case f i led
04 - 23- 13 Fee Account created
04-23 - 13 COMPLAINT

- NO AMT s

Total Due :

360.00

Payment Received:

360.00

04-23 -13 Judge LYLE R ANDERSON assigned .
04-23 - 13 Filed : Other Proposed : Summons - To Issue (Proposed)
04-23-13 Filed order : Order
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON
Signed April 23, 2013
04-23- 13 Issued: Summons - To Issue
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON
04-23-13 TEMPORARY ORDERS scheduled on May 06, 2013 at 09 : 30 AM with
Judge ANDERSON.
05 -02 - 13 ?iled return : Return of Service
Party Served: RODNEY TANGREN
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: April 30 , 2013
05 -06 - 13 Minute Entry - Minutes for TEMPORARY ORDERS HEARING
J udge :
Clerk:

LYLE R ANDERSON
jennifer

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): SHARON FISCUS
Defendant(s): RODNEY TANGREN
Printed: 04/06/15 08 :13 : 0 5
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CASE NUMBER 130700012 Contracts
Plaintiff ' s Attorney(s)

CRAIG C HALLS

Audio
Tape Count: 10:03-10 : 36

HEARING
This matter is before the court for Temporary Orders .
Mr. Halls proffers .
Mr. Tangren proffers .
The court inquires as to whether this matter will be resolved in
the Nevada Courts or in the Utah Courts .
Mr . Halls states the case in Nevada was only to handle the Trust .
There i s no case pending in Nevada at this time .
The court determines the insurance coverage is not adequate for
what the Nevada court was requiring.

The issues regarding the

lease on the property should be determined by the Utah Courts and
not the Nevada Courts .
Mr. Tangren is to carry $2 million in coverage for the propercy .
Mr. Halls to prepare t he order.
05 - 07-13 ?iled: Other Proposed : Order (Proposed) Tempora~y Orders
05-08-13 Filed order: Order Temporary Orders
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON
Signed May 08, 2013
07-03 -13 ?iled : Other Proposed :Order (Proposed) of Judgmen t
07-03 - 13 Filed: Other Proposed :Writ of Restitution (Proposed)
07-03-13 ?iled: Return of Electronic No t ificacion
07-03-13 ? iled: Other - Declined to Sign Writ of Restitution (Proposed)
07 -03-13 Note : Judgement has not been entered
07 - 03 - 13 ?il ed : Other - Declined to Sign Order (Proposed) of Judgment
07 - 03-13 No te : No default cert ificate has been submitted or entered on
Princed : 04/06/ 1 5 08 :1 3 : 05

Page 3
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CASE NUMBER 130700012 Contracts
this case . The summons was not filed with the return of
service.
07-03-13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
07-03-13 Filed : Return of Elec tronic Notification
07-10-13 Filed return : Summons on Return
Party Served : RODNEY TANGREN
Service Type : Personal
Service Date: April 30, 2013
07- 1 0 - 13 Fi led return : Return of Service upon RODNEY TANGERN for
Party Served : RODNEY TANGREN
Service Type : Personal
Service Date : April 30, 2013
07-10-13 Filed: Other Proposed :Default Certificate (Proposed)
07-10-13 Filed : Default Certificate
07-10 - 13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
07 - 10 - 13 Filed : Other Proposed : Writ of Restitu t ion (Proposed)
07 - 10 - 13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
07-22-13 Filed : Other - Dec l ined to Sign Writ of Restitution (Proposed)
07-22 - 13 Note: The Wri t of Restitution refers to a Judgment, but no
judgment has been signed and no judgment has been
submitted.
0 7-22 - 13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-03-13 F iled : Order (Proposed) of Judgment
09 - 03-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-05 - 13 Case Disposition is Judgment
Disposition Judge is LYLE R ANDERSON
09-05-13 Filed order : Order of Judgment
J udge LYLE R ANDERSON
Signed September 05, 2013
09 - 05 - 13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notifica t ion
09-05-13 DETERMINE DAMAGES scheduled on October 07, 20 13 at 01:00 PM
with Judge ANDERSON.
G9 - 05 - 13 Noce: DETERMINE DAMAGES calendar modified.
09-12 - 13 Fi led : Writ of Restitution (Proposed )
09 -12 - 13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notif ica tion
09-16 - 13 Issued : Writ of Restitut i on
J udge LYLE R ANDERSON
09 - 16-13 ? iled: Return of Elec tronic Notification
10 - 02-13 ?iled : Notice of Hearing
Printed : 04 /06/15 08 :13:0 5
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10-02-13 Fi led: Return of Electronic Not i fication
10 - 02-13 DETERMINE DAMAGES scheduled on November 04, 2013 at 09 : 30 AM
with Judge ANDERSON.
10 - 14-13 Filed : Motion Order to Show Cause
?iled by : THE TANGREN FAMILY TRUST,
10- 14- 13 Fi led : Affidavit of Craig C . Halls
10-14-13 Filed: Order (Proposed) to Show Cause
10-14-13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
10 -1 5 - 13 Filed order : Order to Show Cause
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON
Signed October 15, 2013
10 - 15 - 13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
10-22-13 ?iled return : Return of Service
Party Served : RODNEY TANGREN
Service Type : Personal
Service Date : October 16, 2013
10 - 22 - 13 ?iled: Return of Electroni c Notification
11-04-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for DETERMI NE DAMAGES
Judge :
Clerk:

&

OSC

LYLE R ANDERSON
pamelaab

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s) : SHARON FISCUS
Defendant(s) : RODNEY TANGREN
Plaintiff ' s Attorney(s) : CRAIG C HALLS
Audio
Tape Count : 10 : 38

HEARING
Sharon Fiscus is sworn and examined by Mr. Halls .

Plaintiff ' s

exhibit #1 Affidaivt ; Plaintiff exhibit #2 General Liability Policy
and Exhibit #3 Lease Agreement - offered and received.
Mr . Rodney Tangren is sworn a nd examined by Mr. Hall s . Mr . Tang1·en
testifies on his behalf.
Keith McBeth i s sworn and examined by Mr . Tangren .
Printed : 04/06/15 08 : 13:05
Page 5

Mr. Halls
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CASE NUMBER 130700012 Contracts
cross examines .

Mr. Tangre n redirects.

Defendant Exhibit #4 Certificate of Insurance offered and
received .
Ms . Fiscus retakes the stand .

She is examined and cross examined .

Mr . Halls gives his closing argument .
that Mr . Tangren be found in contempt .

He asks for his damages and
Mr . Tangren gives his

argument .
Court finds that Mr . Tangren
attorneys fees .

owes the trust $989 . 76 and the

Court finds him in contempt of cou rt .

asks for a find of $1000 .

Mr. Halls

Court will not impose a penalty.

1 1 -04-13 Filed : Exhibit List
11-12 - 13 Notice - Final Exhibit List
11-25 - 13 Filed : Certificate of Service
11-25-13 Filed : Order (Proposed) on Order to Show Cause
11-25 -1 3 Fil ed: Judgment (Proposed)
11-25-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
11-25-13 F iled : Revised Certificate of Service (I put the wrong date or.
::he last one)
11- 25-13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
11-26-13 Filed : TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 11-04-2013
11-27 - 13 ?iled: Appearance of Counsel Appearance of Counsel
11-27-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
12-02 -1 3 ~iled judgment : Judgment
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON
Signed December 02, 2013
12-02-13 Judgment #1 Entered$ 6063 . 51
Creditor: THE TANGREN F.~1ILY TRUST
Debtor:

RODNEY TANGRE!J
4,618 . 75 AttorneyFees
360 . 00 Fi lingFee s
95 . 00 ProcServFee
989 . 76 Principal
6,063 .51 Judgment Grand Total

12-02-13 riled order: Order on Order to Show Cause
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON
Printed: 04/06/15 08 :1 3 : 05
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CASE NUMBER 130700012 Contracts
Signed December 02, 2013
12-02 - 13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
12-02-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
12-02-13 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 11 - 04-2013
12-03 - 13 Filed : Mo tion to Set AsideOrder of Judgment and Writ of
Restitution
Filed by: TANGREN, RODNEY
12-03-13 Filed: Return of Electroni c Notification
12-03-13 Filed : Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Oreder of
Judgment and Writ o f Restitution
12-03-13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
12-03-13 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration Affidavit of Rodney Tangren
12-03 - 13 Filed : Affidavit/Declaration Affidavit of Hunter Tangren
12-03-13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
12-03 -13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
12-03 - 13 Filed: Exhibit List Exhibits
12 -03 - 13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
12-20-13 Filed : Reply Response in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside
Order of Judgment and Writ of Restitution
12-20-13 Filed : Exhibit List Exhibit A
12-20-13 Filed : Exhibit Li st Exhi bit B
12-20-13 Filed : Exhibit List Exhibit C
12-20-13 Filed : Exhibit List Exhibit D
12-20-13 Filed : Exhibit List Exhibit E
12 - 20-13 Filed : Exhibit List Exhibit F
12 - 20 - 13 Filed: Exhibit List Exhibit G
12-20-13 : iled : Exhibit Lis t Exhibit H
12 - 20-13 Filed : Re turn of Electronic Notifica tion
01 - 13 -1 4 Filed: Reply to Pla intiffs Response in Oppos ition to Defendants
Motion to Set Aside Order of Judgment and Writ of Restitu t ion
01-13-14 Filed : Return of Electronic Not ification
02-06-14 Filed : Request for Hearing
02-06 -14 :ciled : Recurn of Electronic Notification
02-07-14 ORAL ARGUMENT ON MOTION scheduled on Febr uary 24 , 2014 at 03:00
PM with Judge ANDERSON.
02-07-1 4 No tice - NOTICE for Case 1307000 12 ID 15748041
ORAL ARGUMENT ON MOTION is scheduled .
Da te : 02/24/2014
Time: 03 : 00 p . m.
Printed : 04/06/ 1 5 08 :1 3 : 05
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Before Judge : LYLE R ANDERSON
02-07-14 Filed : Notice for Case 1307 00012 ID 15748041
02 - 24 - 14 FURTHER HEARING ON MOTION scheduled on March 11, 2014 at 02 : 00
PM with Judge ANDERSON .
02-24 -14 Minute Entry - Minutes fer ORJl.-L ARGUMENT
Judge :
Clerk:

LYLE R ANDERSON
pamelaab

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s) : SHARON FISCUS
Defendant(s): RODNEY TANGREN
Plaintiff ' s Attorney(s): CRAIG C HALLS
Defendant ' s Attorney(s) : JOANE P WHITE
Audio
Tape Count : 3:03

HEARING
Ms . White gives her arguments to the court .
argument.

Mr . Halls gives his

Ms. White responds with further argument .

Court gives it ' s findings .

Court would like to hear in person

from witnesses for the parties before a decision is made .
Matter is cont inued for further hearing to March 11, 2014 at 2:00
pm.
Mr. Halls inquires about the Writ of Restitution that h as been
served .

Mr . Tangren would like to go back to the property toge~

some more of his clothes . Court would like for him to wait u~ t il
the next hearing takes place.
FURTH~R HEARING ON MOTION is scheduled .
Date: 03/11/2014
Time: 02 : 00 p.m.
Before Judge: LYLE R ANDEP-SON
03- 11 - 14 Received: March 11, 2014
Contai ner: 10 day SuITLmons ( Pltfl Location : locked drawer
03 - 11 - 14 Rec e ~ved : March 11, 2014
Printed : 04/06/15 08 :13 :06
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Container : Return of Service (Pltf) Location: locked drawer
03-11-14 Received : March 11, 2014
Container: Return of Service by Art Hines

(Def) Location:

locked drawer
03-11-14 Received : March 11, 2014
Contai ner: Service copy of SuITL~ons and Order (Def) Location:
locked drawer
03-11-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for FURTHER HEARING ON MOTION
Judge :
Clerk:

LYLE R ANDERSON
conniea

PRESENT
Defendant(s) : RODNEY TANGREN
Plaintiff ' s Attorney(s)

CRAIG C HALLS

Defendant's Attorney(s)

JOANE? WHITE

Audio
Tape Count: 2:04:00

HEARING
COUNT : 2:04 : 00
This matter is before the court to take evidence regarding ser vice
on a motion to set aside judgment .
2:04:51 Mr. Halls asks that witnesses be excluded and cour t grants
the same .
Halls.

Sh awn Chapman is called, sworn and examined by Mr.

Exhibit 1 (Return of Service), Exhibit 2 (10 day Summons) and
Exhibit 3 (Complaint packet that was served) are o ff ered and
received.
2 : 15 : 04 Ms. White cross - examines.

Exhibit 4 (Service copy of

Sum.~ons and copy of Order) is offered and r eceived .

Exhibit S

(Recurn of Service by Art Hines) i s offered and rece i ved.
2 : 25 : 58 Mr . Hal l s redi rects .

Ms . White rec ross - examines .

2 : 27 : 26 Rodney Ta ngren is call ed, sworn and examined by Mr. Halls .
Princed: 04/06/15 08 :13:0 6
Page 9
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CASE NUMBER 130700012 Contracts
Exhibit 6 (transcript of 11/4/13) is offered.

Ms . White objects .

Page 11 i s only considered as evidence (received) .
Exhibit 7 (certified copy of Nevada transcript) is offered and
received.
2 : 43 : 27 Ms. White cross-examines and also conducts direct
examination .
2 : 57:49 Mr . Halls doesn ' t have any other witnesses .
2 : 58 : 08 Hunter Shelby Tangren is called, sworn and examined by Ms.
White .
3:02:54 Mr . Halls cross-examines .

The parties have no more

evidence to present.
3:05 : 43 Mr. Hal l s gives his sum.rnary followed by Ms . White .
3:14 : 20 The court finds that the summons and complaint were served
on Rodney Tangren by Shawn Chapman.

The court questions Mr . Halls

about issuing only a 10 days summons to answer the complaint.

Mr.

Halls was expecting Mr .
Tangren to have to answer in a shortened period of time .

Mr.

Halls considers this to be similar to an unlawful detainer action .
The court has questions about the authority of Mr . Halls to give 10
days time to Mr .
Tangren to answer the complaint without getting permission from
the court .

The ccurt will consider memoranda filed by the parties

and wi ll take this matter unde~ advisement .
3 :36:11 Mr . Halls asks for Exhibit 3 to be returned t o him and Ms.
Whi te objects.

The court does not return the exhibit.

3 : 37 : 00 Mr . Hall s has 28 jays to file his memorandum and Ms . White
has 14 days to respond .
End t ime 3:3 7 :56
03 - 12 - 14 Received : March 12 , 2014
Container : Complaint p ac ket that was served Loca tion :
Printed : 0 4 /06/ 15 08:13 : 06
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03-12 - 14 Received : March 12, 2014
Container : Transcript of 11/4/13 - only page 11 Location :
03-12 - 14 Received : March 12, 2014
Container: Certified copy of Nevada transcript Location:
03-1 2- 14 Filed : Exhib it List

- Final Exhibit List
03-28 - 14 Fee Account created
Total Du e:
03-28-14 Fee Account created
Total Due :
03 - 28-14 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received :
03 - 12- 14 Notice

10 . 00
1. 86

10 . 00

Note: POSTAGE-COPIES
03 - 28-14 POSTAGE - COPIES

Payment Received :

1. 86

04 - 02-14 Filed : Request for CD
04-28-1 4 Filed: Reply Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Brief on
10 - Day Summons
04-28 - 14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
04 - 29-14 Filed : Brief on 10-day Summons
04 - 29-14 Filed : Return of El ectronic Notification
05-02 - 14 Filed : Reply to Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Brief or_
10-Day Summons
05 - 02 - 14 ?iled : Return of Electronic Notification
05-27 - 14 Filed : Notice to Submit for Decision
05-27 - 14 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
08-13-14 Filed order : Ruling on Motion to Set Aside Default
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON
Signed August 13, 2014
08-20-14 Filed: Order (Proposed) Denying Motion to Sec Aside Judgment
08-20- 1 4 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
08 - 20-14 Filed : Other - Unsigned Order (Proposed) Denying Motion to Set
Aside Judi;ment
08-20-14 No te : No proof of service to de fendan t . L Page 435-259-1350
08 - 20-14 Filec : Return of El ectronic Notification
08 -28-14 ?iled: Notice of Proposed Order Denying Mo tion to Set Aside
Judgment
08 - 28-14 Fil ed : Return of Electronic Notification
09-10 - 14 Fi l ed: Or der (Proposedi Denying Motion to Set Aside Judgment
09-10 - 14 Fi led : Return of El ectronic Notificat ion
09 - 11 - 14 Filed : Request/No t ice to Submi.t
09 - 11-14 ?iled: Return o f Electronic No ti fication
09-15-14 ?iled o rder : Order Denyi ng Motion to Set As i de Judgment
Printed : 04/06/ 1 5 08 : 13 :0 7
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Judge LYLE R ANDERSON
Signed September 15, 2014
09-15-14 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
10-09-14 Filed: Motion for Attorney Fees
Fil e d by: FISCUS, SHARON
10-09-14 Filed: Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs by Craig C. Halls
10 - 09-14 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
10 - 14-14 Filed: Notice of Appeal - Civil Notice of Appeal
10-14- 14 Fee Account created
10-14 - 14 APPEAL

Total Due :

225 . 00

Payment Received:

225 . 00

10 - 14-14 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification
10 - 15-14 Note: Called attorney regarding cost bond .
sending it today .

They will be

10-15 - 14 Nace: No tice of Appeal emailed to the Supreme Court .
10- 1 6- 14 Bond Account created
10-16-14 Bond Posted

Total Due:
Payment Received:

300.00
300 . 00

Note: Mail Payment;
10-17 - 14 Filed : Response in Opposition to Motion for Attorneys Fees
10 - 17-14 ?iled : Return of Electronic Notifica tion
10-22 -1 4 Note : Appealed : Case #20140938
11 -20 - 14 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 02-24 - 2014
11-20-14 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 03-11 - 2014
11-24-14 Note : Transcripts Received and are i n Vault
1 2-02 - 14 Filed : Notice of Record Index Transmitted to Utah State Appeals
with Certified Mail Receipt
12 - 08-14 Filed re t urn : Re t urn
Party Served: UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Service Type : Mail
Service Date : December 04, 2014
02-04-15 Filec : TR..l>,NSCRIPT for Hearing of 05-06-2013
02 -17-15 Filed : Order from Utah Court of Appeals granting motion to
supplement the record
02-25 -1 5 Fil ed : Return Recept for Certifi ed Mail
03 - 12-15 ?ilec: Or der (Proposed) To Continue
03-12-15 ?ilec: Ret~rn of Electronic Noti fica tion
03-12 - 15 Filed: Other - Uns igned Order (Proposed) To Continue
03 - 12-15 Note: This order is filed in a Monticello case 130700012
instead of in Carbon County. Jana
03-1 2 - 15 Filed : Re~ ~rn of Electronic Notif ication
Printed: 04/0E/15 08 :13:0 7
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l)Jaintiffs in Obtaining Defa11lt

CRAIG C. HALLS # 1317
333 South Main Street
Blanding, Utah 84511
Telephone: (435)678-3333
Facsimile: (435)678-3330
Attorney for Plaintiff
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DISTRICT couRT oF THE s:r,ATE,oF~Bmfli
'
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SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC'L;s
SAJ\f JUAN c6uNTf'.:.::- _:'~
;,·-·..
...
TANGREN FAMILY TRUST
SHARON FISCUS Trustee of the Tangren
Plaint iff(s)

\

....

'ORI)_~ R OF JUDGMENT

Case Number 130700012
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

vs.
RODNEY TANGRE'-1
Defendant(s)

The-Default of the Defendant in this matter having been entered by the Court upon
Defendants default, the Court hereby finds the Defendant was in Default under the terms of the
Lease dated February 22, 1994 and that the Plaintiffs gave appropriate notice to the Defendant to
cure said default wh ich the Defendants have not done and so thereby they are entitl ed to an Writ
o f Restitution restoring them to the possess ion of the properties. Additional ly this maner is set
for a hearing to determine damages.

_ _ __ __ , 2013,

Said hearing to be held on the _

_ day of

CRAIG C. HALLS # 13 17
333 South Main Street
Bland ing, Utah 84511
Telephone: (435)678-3333
Facsimile: (435)678-3330

.,J'.6:'. .t.i .,

Attorney for Plaintiff

"-~

•t;.

DISTRICT COURT OF THE S~ AT~ ,€>F
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIS'FRIC~
SAN JUAN G:OUNTY~.;· .. .f"

-~D

~'Ji.t

··,

TANGREN FAMILY TRUST
SHARON FISCUS Trustee of the Tangrei1
Family Trust.
Plaintiff(s)

· WRIT, OF RESTITUTION

Case Number I 30700012
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

vs.
RODNEY TAN GREN
De fen dan t(s)

TO THE SHERIFF OF SAN JUAN COUNTY:
The Court having entered the Order of Judgment in this case allow ing a Writ of
Restitution, pursuant to the Defaul t of th~ Defendant. The Plaintiff, the Tangren Family Trust
and Sharon Fiscus Trustee has recovered a Judgment against the Defendant, Rodney Tangren of
Caveman Ranch. Box 1705, Moab. Utah ii1 an ev iction action in the Seventh Judicial District
Court in and for San Juan County, State of Utah dated _ _ day of - -- - - -- , 2013.
The Court hereby orders restitution of the fol lowing described property to wit:
Parcel I : Ail that certai n lot, piece and parcel of land lying si1uate and
rei1~g i1 , San J uan Coumy nnd knovvn as the NE 1/4 NE l/4, section 12, T27S,
R20E, SLBM, conta in ing 40 acres, more or less.
27S 20E 12 000

Parcel 2: All that certain lot, piece and parcel of land lying situate and
being in San Juan County and being described as fo llows: E ½ of the SE 1/4 SE
1/4, S E 1/4 NE 1/4 SE 1/4, Section 1, T27S, R20E, SLBM. Lots 11 and 12,
Section 6; Lot 2, Section 7; T27S R2 I E, SLBM, Township 37 South, Ra nge 19
East, SLBM, Section 16: San Juan County.
27S 20£ 01 7200
·~- .
}
27S21E066000
.\
27 S21 E 07 3000
1~, ;·

f_i~,.

-r, '

-~·=" ;,:•
.,·

1

You are hereby commanded to immediately rJ!hove the Qifendant, R odney Tangren,
•

··1 ·~;

·~-

I

from the said premises and to restore the Plaintiffs, the Tangren Family Trust and Sharon Fiscus
.:;,

Trustee, to the possession of the p,·0pe1ty. You are fu1ther commanded to remove from said
premises all personal property not the property of the Plaintiff, and to store and dispose the same
according to Law and to make due return of this Writ with in 10 days.

•

CRAIG C. HALLS # 1317
333 South Main Street
Blanding, Utah 84511
Telephone: (435)678-3333
Facsimile: (435)678-3330
Attorney for Plaintiff

•/'··(,.
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DISTRICT couRT oF THE s1t¾TE1
0F •,lE~
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SEVENTH JUDICI~~ DI~.'~RIC1fSAN JUAN COUNTY \,
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V

TANGREN FAMfLY TRUST
SHARON FlSCUS Trustee of the Tangr~n
Plaintiff(s)

CERTIFICATE
OF DEFAULT
' -..· :JUDGMENT

VS.

Case Number 130700012
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

,·. ,.,,...

,

RODNEY TANGRD✓
Defendant(s)

DEFAULT
In this action. Rodney Tangren, hav ing been regularly served with summons and
complaint, and having fai led to answer, and the time allowed by law for response having expired,
the default of said Defendant is he,·eby entered according to law.

•

CRAIG C. HALLS #I 317
333 South Main Street
Blanding, Utah 845 11
Telephone: (435)678-3333
Facsimile: (435)678-3330
Attorney for Plaintiff
-h
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r~ ·Jl

~-:t
\.,

'

,

DISTRICT couRT OF THE s:ri\.'TE,<t>F \,Tllrn
~
11"
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISJJRIC 1)
SAN JUAN GOUNTY1i~. ,_/
, • ,_,.¥·;;,.::::
:.. ,

TANGREN FAMILY TRUST
SHARON FISCUS Trustee of the Tan2:ren
.
Family Trust.
Plaintiff(s)

.-

WR;g OF RESTITUTION

~

· Case Number 1307000 I 2
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

vs.
RODNEY TANGREN
Defendant(s)

TO THE SHERIFF OF SAN JU/\N COUNTY:
The Court hav ing entered the Order of Judgment in this case allowing a Writ of
Restitution, pursuant to the Default of the Defendant. The Plaintiff, the Tangren Family Trust
and Sharon Fiscus Trustee has recovered a Judgment against the Defendant, Rodney Tangren of
Caveman Ranch, Box 1705 , Moab, Utah in an eviction action in the Seventh Judicial District
Court in and for San Juan County, State of Utah dated _ _ day of

- -- - - -- , 20 13.

The Court hereby orders restitution of the fo llowing described property to wit:
Parce l 1: Al l that certain lot, piece and parcel of land lying siwate and
being in San Juan County and known as the NE 1/4 NE 1/4, section i2, T27S,
R20E, S LBM, contai ning 40 acres, more or less.
27S 20E 12 000

Parcel 2: All that certain lot, piece and parcel of land lying situate and
being in San Juan County and being described as follows: E ½ of the SE 1/4 SE
1/4, SE 1/4 NE 1/4 SE 1/4, Section 1, T27S, R20E, SLBM. Lots 11 and 12,
Section 6; Lot 2, Section 7; T27S R21 E, SLBM, Township 37 South, Range 19
East, SLBM, Section 16: San Juan County.
,,,;\~!, -t; )'
1
27S 20E 0 I 7200
-~
27S 21 E 06 6000
/\,{/> ~...,, .i
27 S2 l E 07 3000
f!· ·
~·
-l.~
-,~-: 'i-
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...
You are hereby commanded to immediately rerh'ove tf\9. J?e'fendant, Rodney Tangren,

..•..

;_

•✓.:."'

.,

•

•' ' j f

from the said premises and to restore the Plau:itiffs_, the Tangren Family Trust and Sharon Fiscus
•

'\, I

\ ~.\

~

Trustee, to the possession of the property . . You are further commanded to remove from said
premises all personal property not the property of the Plaintiff, and to store and dispose the same
.; ...~ '·"".

according to Law and to make due returl).ofthis Writ within 10 days.

·-

CRAIG C. HALLS # 1317
333 South Main Street
Blanding, Utah 845 I 1
Telephone: (435)678-3333
Facsimile: (435)678-3330
Attorney for Plaintiff
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DISTRICT COURT OF THE S~'D~Tlf~OF ·: ~~
SEVENTH JUDICIA!, D1'&})RIC!1f>
SAN JUAN COUNTY 4). -.il
TANGREN FAMILY TRUST
SHARON FISCUS Trustee of the Tangren
Plaintiff(s)
'.'::

. •·

ORQ~R OF JUDGMENT
).
!;.'

Case Number 1307000 12
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

vs.
RODNEY TANGREN
Defendant(s)

The pefauit of the Defendant in this matter having been entered by the Court upon
Defendants default, the Cou1t hereby find s the Defendant was in Default under the terms of the
Lease dated February 22, 1994 and that the Plaintiffs gave appropriate notice to the Defendant to
cure said default which the Defendants have not done and so thereby they are entitled to an Writ
of Restitution restoring them to the possession of the properties. Additionally this man er is ser
for a hearing to determine damages. Sa id hearing to be held on the _ _ day of

- - - - - -, 2013.
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Ruling

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

TANGREN FAMILY TRUST, SHARON
FISCUS Trustee,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT

vs.
RODNEY TANGREN,
De.fendant,

Case No. 130700012

This court has previously informed the parties that it doee
not credit the t estimony of defendant Rodney Tangren that l) he was
not actually served with the summons and complaint, and 2) he was
so confused by multiple proceedings before this court that he did
not understand the need to answer the complaint.

From the evidence

presented, it is clear to this court that defendant was properly
served with the summons and complaint and that the reason he did
not answer the complaint is that he did not read the summons.
Even for parties who elect to repreeent themselves,
effort must be required by the court .

some

Defendant exerted virtually

no effort to understand what the court required of him.

Instead,

he attempted to bluff his way through the proceedings, having made
a deliberate decision not to seek advice of counsel because he was
sure of the rightness of his position.

The court also believes he

intended to save on his own expenses by representing himself while
at the same time increasing the costs of his r epresented opponent
by

resisting

s trenuously

her

every

effor t .

Unfortunately,

defendant's strenuous efforts failed to include actually readi ng
the summons and complaint.

The court does not treat all part ies

equally if it allows a self represented party to declare a "kings
X" after his solo efforts have ended in disaster.

The only ground for setting aside the default which the court
considers seriously is the truly odd choice of plaintiff's counsel
to serve defendant with a 10 day summons.

Counsel still has not

explained his decision to issue a summons allowing only ten days
for the filing of an answer.

Rule 3(a) (2), U. R.C.P., does provi de

for the issuance of ·a ten day summons.
to

the

time

after

service

in

However, "ten days " r efers

which plaintiff

can

file

the

complai nt , not the time for de f endant to ans we r.
Rule 12(a), U.R.C . P., requires that an answer be fil ed withi n
either 20 or 30 day s after service of the s ummons and compla i nt
depending on whether the service is accomplished ins ide or outside
Utah.

Because service was a ccompl i she d in Utah, 20 days would be

required here i n t he absence of a contrary provi sion .

The cour t

invited counsel for plaintiff to explain in his memorandu.m what
statutory provision justified allowing only ten days.

Counsel has

provided none .

The court is accordingly compelled to determine

that the summons

served on defendant incorrectly stated that

defendant had only ten days to answer the complaint.
The key question presented here ia whether such a glaring
defect in the language of the summons justifies a determination
that

service

itself

was

ineffective.

The

Defendant was served on April 30, 2013.
was signed on July 10, 2013.

facts

are

clear.

The default certificate

Notwithstanding the language of the

summons, defendant was not required to answer in ten days.

Rather,

he had a full 80 days in which he could have filed an answer before
the default was entered.
The parties have cited no case where a summons erroneously
allowed ten days instead of 20 days.

However, there are several

cases involving a summons purporting to allow only 20 days when the
law actually allowed 30 days.

In Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897

(Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court held that service of a 20 day
summons when a 30 day summons was required rendered servi ce fatally
defective,

and the default judgment was vacated.

It is worth

noting that, in Martin, the serving officer made a false statement
in his return of service.

In Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d

879 (Utah 1981), however, the Utah Supreme Court approved amendment
of the summons from 20 days to 30 days rather than dismissal.

In

Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989, 2008 UT App. 209, the Utah Court of
Appeals extended the rationale of Meyers to validate a 20 day
summons when a 30 days summons should have been served, given that
the trial court had allowed the full 30 days.
There is no question that, in this case, defendant was not
affected or prejudiced by the summons using ten days when 20 days
were required.

The reason defendant did not answer the complaint

is that he was so confident of his unadvised opinions that he
failed to even consider that an answer would be required.

A

cursory reading of the summons with a minimum of attention would
have sufficed, but this defendant declined to do.
This court interprets Meyers and Kenny to be as applicable to
a case where a summons erroneously reads "ten" where it should read
"20" as it is to a case where a summons reads "20" instead of "3on.
Accordingly, given that the defect did not deceive or confuse or
prejudice defendant, and that defendant ended up with 80 days in
which to answer, the court concludes that the defect in the summons
does not warrant setting aside the default.
In considering the equities of defendant's motion the court
has taken into account that defendant has a 99 year lease at $150
per month for a parcel of truly unique property in Utah's canyon
country.

The court also recalls from previous litigation that

defendant has made substantial improvements to the property.

The

court accepts that this property may be worth as much as defendant
claims, namely millions of dollars.
On the other hand,

defendant has had possession of

the

property for almost 20 years and had substantial opportunity to
garner the fruits of that possession.

Earlier litigation about

this property could not have left defendant in doubt about his
status as a tenant rather than an owner.

As far as this court

knows, no party has ever raised a question about the sufficiency of
the consideration paid by defendant for possession of the property,
but in evaluating the equities of this case, the court cannot help
but notice that a rental of $150 per month would capitalize to a
value of about $15-30 thousand.

In other words, most tenants would

expect to pay $150 ·per month on an annual lease for a property
worth $15 to 30 thousand.

Yet, defendant managed to secure a 99

year lease for a fixed rent of $150 per month on unique property
with value supposedly in the millions of dollars.

The best that

could be said about· this situation is that defendant, with such
favorable lease terms, should have been exceedingly careful not to
breach any provision of the lease.
Finally, the court notes from the earl i er proceeding i nvolv ing
this property that defendant is a benefic iary of the trust o f which

plaintiff is trustee.

Therefore, termination of the lease does not

deprive defendant of every benefit of the property.
that

he

will

have

to

share

those

benefits

It does mean

with

the

other

beneficiaries of the trust.
Defendant's motion is denied.

Counsel for plaintiff should

submit a formal order pursuant to Rule 7, U.R.C.P.
DATED this

/~/ti

day of August, 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 130700012 by the method and on the date
specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

CRAIG C HALLS
JOANE P WHITE
08/13/2014

Date:

/s/ CONNIE ADAMS

Deputy Court Clerk

Printed: 08/13/14 15:40 : 56
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CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
403 South Main Street
Blanding, Utah 84511
Telephone: (435)678-3333
craigchal ls@yahoo.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SAN JUAN COUNTY
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET
ASIDE JUDGMENT

TANGREN FAMILY TRUST
SHARON FISCUS Trustee of the Tangren
Plaintiff(s)

I

vs.

I
!
I

i
I

i Case Number 130700012
i

RODNEY TANGREN
Defendant(s)

I Judge: Lyle R. Anderson
I

The matter came on for hearing on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Order of Judgment
and Writ of Restitution on the 7th day of February, 20 14 and was reheard on the 24u, day of
February, 2014. The Court now being fu lly advised in the premises does hereby make the
following Findings of Fact:
1. The Court does not credit the testimony of Rodney Tangren that he was not actuall:-,
served with a Summons and Complaint and that he was confused by multiple proceedi ngs befo::e
this Court and did not understand the need to answer the Complaint.
2. T he Court finds that with the evidence presented , that Defendant was pro perly c:erved
w ith a Summons and Complaint and that the reason he did not answer the Complaint was thm h~
did not read the Summons.

TangrenFarnTrust.Ord Deny Mot set aside Judg ment.wpd
September 15, 2014 08:33 PM

1 of :3

3. The Co urt finds that M r. Tangren exe1ted v i1tually no effo1t to understand what was
required of him w ith regard to the Summons.
4. The Court finds that instead of acting upon the Summons he attempted to bluff his
way through the proceedings.
5. T he Cou1t finds that Mr. Tang ren made a deliberate decision not to seek advice of
counsel because he was sure of the rightness of his position.
6. T he Court finds that Mr. Tangren intended to save on his own expenses by
representing himself at the same time intending to increase the costs of his opponent by resisting
strenuously her every effort.
7. The Court finds that the only grounds for setting aside the default in this case that t he
Court considered seriously is the odd choice of Plaintiffs counsel to serve Defendant with a ten
(10) day Summons.
8. The Co urt finds that the Plaintiff was invited to indicate to the Court any statutory
authority for filing a ten ( I 0) day Summons. Plaintiff has provided none.
9. The Court finds that the Summons incorrectly stated that the Defendant had only ten
( 10) days to answer the Complaint.
I 0. The Court finds that Lhe issue then before the Court is the determination of whether
that service is in itself ineffective.

11 . T he Court find s that the De fendant was served on Apri l 30, 201 3, and the Defaul:
Certificate w as signed on July IO, 20 13.
12. The Court find s that notw ithstanding the language the Defendant was not required to

answer in that ten ( I 0) day pe riod, but rather he had a full eighty (80) days in w hic h he co·Jld
have fi led an answer be fore the defau lt was entered.
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13. The Court finds that there is case authority in Utah to allow a party to approve a
summons where a shorter period of time was stated in the summons, but a greater period was
allowed.
14. The Court finds that the Defendant in this case was not effected or prejudiced by the
Summons using ten ( I 0) days when hventy (20) days were required.
15. T he Court finds that the defect in the Summons where it read ten (10) days when it
should have read twenty (20) days did not deceive, confuse or prejudice the Defendant and that
the Defendant had up to eighty (80) days in which to answer.
THEREFORE The Court concludes that the defect in the Summons does not warrant
setting aside the default. The Motion to Set Aside the Default and the Writ of Restitution is
hereby denied. The Judgment entered on the 2 nd day of December, 2013 in the amount of Six
Thousand Sixty Three Dollars and Fifty One Cents ($6,063.51) is in full force. A Writ of
Restitution is valid and effectual for the possession of the property by the Plaintiffs.

- - -- - - - -- - - End of Document- - -- - - -- - - - -
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O!PINION BY: HENRIOD
OPINION
HENRJOD. Chief Justice:
Appeal from a judgment entered on a complaint
based on accrued amounts a llegedly d ue m a divorce
action. Reversed with costs to defendant.
Mr. N, a California resident, was served with process
by a California peace officer, who, under oath in a return
of service of summons, wittingly or unwittingly falsified

the facts by stating therein that he endorsed the date and
place of address, together with signing his name on the
Summons, as is required by Rule 4(j), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The paper involved shows, without
controversy, that such statement was untru,,.
Service of process here was defective, not on ly
because of the false return but because it required answer
in 20 days instead of 30 days. 1 Such service is
jurisdictional. 2 Defendant, as was his right, appeared
specially and raised the point.
Title 78-27-25 et seq., Utah Code Annotated
1953.
2 Rule 4(j), Utah Rules of Civil Pracedure.

[*2] The case is remanded with ins1ruction to
vacate the judgment and let the parties rake it from there.
ELLETT,
CROCKETT,
MAUGHAN, JJ., concur.
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